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A variety of distributed protocols require pairs of neighbouring nodes of a network to repeatedly
interact in pairwise exchanges of messages of mutual interest. Well known examples include file-
sharing systems [4] and gossip dissemination protocols [18, 17], among many other examples. These
protocols can operate in very diverse settings such as wireless ad-hoc or peer-to-peer overlay net-
works. These settings pose three main challenges. First, networks are inherently dynamic, whether
due to uncontrolled mobility or maintenance of the overlay. Second, since communication may be
costly, nodes may act rationally by not sending messages, while still receiving messages from their
neighbours. Third, nodes may have incomplete information about the network topology. In this
work, we aim at gaining theoretical insight into how to persuade agents to exchange messages in
dynamic networks.
We take a game theoretical approach to determine necessary and sufficient conditions under
which we can persuade rational agents to exchange messages, by holding them accountable for
deviations with punishments. Unlike previous work [19, 6, 7, 5, 20, 18, 17, 9], we do not assume the
network is the result of rational behaviour or that the topology changes according to some known
probability distribution, and we do not limit our analysis to one-shot pairwise interactions. We
make three contributions: (1) we provide a new game theoretical model of repeated interactions in
dynamic networks, where agents have incomplete information of the topology, (2) we define a new
solution concept for this model, and (3) we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for enforcing
accountability, i.e., for persuading agents to exchange messages in the aforementioned model.
Our results are of technical interest but also of practical relevance. We show that we cannot
enforce accountability if the dynamic network does not allow for timely punishments. In practice,
this means for instance that we cannot enforce accountability in some networks formed in file-sharing
applications such as Bittorrent [4]. We also show that for applications such as secret exchange, where
the benefits of the exchanges significantly surpass the communication costs, timely punishments are
enough to enforce accountability. However, we cannot in general enforce accountability if agents
do not possess enough information about the network topology. Nevertheless, we can enforce
accountability in a wide variety of networks that satisfy 1-connectivity [15] with minimal knowledge
about the network topology. This result provides a sound game theoretical foundation for the
empirical results presented in [18, 17, 9], showing that we can in fact enforce accountability in
gossip dissemination with connected overlay networks where nodes possess sufficient information
about the network.
∗E-mail: xvilaca@gsd.inesc-id.pt. Address: INESC-ID, R. Alves Redol, 9, Lisbon, Portugal. Tel.: +351 213 100
359.
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1 Introduction
A variety of protocols require pairs of neighbouring nodes of a network to repeatedly interact in
pairwise exchanges of messages that are of mutual interest to both parties. Well known examples
include file-sharing systems [4] and gossip dissemination protocols [18, 17, 9]. These protocols can
operate in very diverse settings such as wireless ad-hoc or peer-to-peer overlay networks. These
settings pose three main challenges. First, networks are inherently dynamic, whether due to uncon-
trolled mobility or maintenance of the overlay. Second, since communication may be costly, nodes
may act rationally by not sending messages, while still receiving messages from their neighbours.
Third, nodes may have incomplete information about the network topology. In this work, we aim at
gaining theoretical insight into how to persuade agents to exchange messages in dynamic networks.
A growing body of literature has taken a game theoretical approach [22] to address rational
behaviour in a variety of distributed problems in static networks (e.g., [10, 1, 2, 3, 26]). Nodes are
viewed as being under the control of rational agents 1 that seek to maximize individual utilities.
In these lines, we use Game Theory to address the problem of rational behaviour in pairwise
exchanges of messages over links of a dynamic network. We consider that agents obtain a benefit
of receiving messages from their neighbours, and incur costs for sending and receiving messages.
We are interested in protocols that satisfy two properties: (1) agents exchange messages in every
pairwise interaction with neighbours, in order to provide some useful service such as file-sharing
and (2) the protocols are equilibria according to some solution concept (e.g., Nash equilibrium),
so that no agent gains (increases its utility) by deviating from the protocol. Protocols that satisfy
these properties are said to enforce accountability in pairwise exchanges.
Folk Theorems. Results known as Folk Theorems have shown that it is possible to enforce
accountability by holding agents accountable for deviations with punishments that decrease their
utility [19], provided that (1) agents want to participate in exchanges, i.e., the benefits of receiving
messages outweigh the communication costs, (2) agents perceive interactions to occur infinitely
often, which is possible if the end-horizon of interactions is unknown [22], and (3) a monitoring
infrastructure provides agents with sufficient information regarding the past behaviour of other
agents, so that any deviation from the protocol may be promptly detected and punished. In a
distributed system, agents may only learn about past behaviour of other agents in messages re-
ceived from their neighbours. Therefore, a monitoring infrastructure is constrained by the network.
Unfortunately, most proofs of Folk Theorems assume an exogenous monitoring infrastructure, ig-
noring the constraints imposed by dynamic networks. Some proofs of Folk Theorems take into
account network constraints [6, 24], but they assume that networks are static or that agents know a
probability distribution over topologies at each point in time. Such knowledge may not be readily
available to agents in our setting. As we shall see, this poses multiple challenges not addressed by
existing proofs of Folk Theorems.
Contributions. We bridge the gap between existing proofs of Folk Theorems and the goal of
enforcing accountability in dynamic networks. We make three contributions: (1) we provide a new
game theoretical model of repeated interactions in dynamic networks, where agents have incomplete
information of the topology, (2) we define a new solution concept for this model, and (3) we identify
necessary and sufficient conditions for enforcing accountability in the aforementioned model.
Game Theoretical Model. We consider that an adversary selects the network topologies [15].
We focus on networks that are not under the control of the agents, exemplified by wireless ad-hoc
networks and overlays such as [18, 17]. To capture such exogenous restrictions on the network,
we assume that the adversary is oblivious to the messages sent by agents, selecting the topologies
for all times prior to the beginning of the exchanges. At each point in time, agents learn partial
1Henceforth, we use the designation agent when referring to both the node and the rational agents.
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information about the current topology, including the identities of their current neighbours. They
also possess information about the set G of dynamic networks that the adversary may generate. In
practice, the set G represents basic information known by agents regarding the network structure.
For instance, in an overlay network designed to disseminate data in a reliable fashion, agents
expect the adversary to only generate connected graphs, whereas in a more dynamic setting such
as a wireless ad-hoc network, G may contain a wider variety of non-connected graphs.
Solution Concept. We define a solution concept for our model, named G-Oblivious Adversary
Perfect Equilibrium (G-OAPE). To understand its definition, it is useful to recall the notion of
Nash equilibrium, which states that a protocol is an equilibrium if it is a best response, i.e., no
agent can gain by deviating given that other agents also do not deviate. This definition does not
suit our purposes for two reasons. First, it does not consider deviations off the equilibrium path,
i.e., deviations that occur after histories of messages where some agents have deviated [22]. Thus,
a Nash equilibrium may rely on empty threats of punishments such as punishments that also cause
some utility loss to the punishers. Second, agents must know the probability distribution of the
adversary generating each topology. The first issue is addressed in the literature by the notion of
sequential equilibrium (SE) [14], which requires protocols to be best responses after every history
of messages. To address the second issue, the notion of G-OAPE refines SE by requiring protocols
to be best responses after every history, for any fixed network in G generated by the adversary.
In other words, we require that agents cannot gain from deviating given that the adversary may
generate any network in G.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. The main goal of the paper is to determine the degree
of dynamism that we can tolerate in order to enforce accountability in pairwise exchanges, i.e.,
we aim to determine necessary and sufficient restrictions on G for G-OAPE protocols that enforce
accountability to exist. Our results show that the ability to enforce accountability depends not
only on G but also on the structure and utility of pairwise exchanges.
We determined the weakest set of restrictions on G for which we can enforce accountability.
Our first result shows that G must satisfy a property named timely punishments. Intuitively, this
property states that for ever pairwise exchange between agents i and j, agent j must always be able
to communicate a deviation of i to some third agent that later interacts with i, and thus is able
to punish i for that deviation. This restriction is not met by some networks such as file-sharing
overlays (e.g., Bittorrent [4]), where users with similar interests interact frequently with each other
but only rarely with users with different interests. Our next result provides a G-OAPE protocol that
enforces accountability, assuming that G is restricted by timely punishments and that exchanges are
valuable, that is, agents have a high benefit/cost ratio of receiving/sending messages and neglect
download costs. Such type of exchanges occurs, for instance, when agents share small but highly
valuable secrets such as private keys [18, 17].
In many cases, the assumption that pairwise exchanges are valuable is too restrictive. For in-
stance, in file-sharing, we may expect agents to be interested in exchanging large files, but the cost
of uploading such files is certainly non-negligible, and the benefit-to-cost ratio of receiving/sending
files may be small. It is therefore of practical interest to understand whether we can enforce ac-
countability in more general settings. Our final two results identify a necessary and a sufficient
condition to achieve this goal. Namely, we show that G must satisfy, in addition to timely punish-
ments, a property that we call eventual distinguishability. Roughly speaking, this property states
that whenever two (or more) agents may punish i from defecting in the past (towards some other
agent j), they have the information necessary to coordinate their actions, so that the total number
of additional punishments for a single deviation of i is never too large. Whether G satisfies eventual
distinguishability depends both on the properties of graphs in G and on the information available
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Figure 1: timely punishments (TP), eventual distinguishability (ED), and connectivity (C).
to agents about the topology. Following previous work in dynamic networks [15], we consider a
class of connected networks where agents have knowledge of the degree of their neighbours, which
are formed by overlay networks such as [18, 17, 9]. We show that if graphs in G are contained in
this class of connected networks, then there is a protocol that enforces accountability in general
pairwise exchanges.
Summary of Results. Our results are summarized in Fig. 1. We show that, in general, timely
punishments (grey area) and eventual distinguishability (dotted area) are necessary conditions for
enforcing accountability, whereas connectivity is a sufficient condition (protocol P1). In valuable
pairwise exchanges, timely punishments are sufficient for enforcing accountability (protocol P2).
Related work. Existing works have used Game Theory to analyse interactions in file sharing [13,
21, 16] and gossip dissemination [18, 17]. Unlike these works, we do not limit our analysis to one-
shot pairwise interactions. Our proposed model and results are more related to work in models
of dynamic games and network formation games. In the former, the structure of the game being
repeated varies in each repetition according to a known probability distribution [19, 6, 7]. This
captures repetitions of the same game where only the network topology varies. In the latter, the
network is the outcome of the actions of rational agents [5, 20]. To the best of our knowledge, none
of these models captures network variations as being caused by an adversary oblivious to the actions
of agents, and they do not model incomplete information of the network topology. Hence, they
are not appropriate for modelling unpredictable changes in the network such as physical topology
changes. More importantly, they do not address the challenges of devising distributed monitoring
mechanisms. Work in reputation systems such as [8] have proposed and analysed distributed
systems that perform monitoring, but they do not prove Folk Theorems.
2 Model
We consider a synchronous message passing system with reliable communication in a dynamic
network. The system entities are the rational agents, which send messages over links of the network,
and an oblivious adversary, which selects the dynamic network at the beginning. Specifically, time
is divided into rounds. Prior to the execution of the protocol, the adversary selects an evolving
graph G that specifies the communication graph Gm of each round m. Let G be the set of all
evolving graphs, and let N = {1 . . . n} be the set of agents, where n is the number of agents. As
in [1, 2], we assume that edges are private: agent i can send a message to j at round m only if j
is a neighbour of i in Gm, and if i sends that message, then exactly j receives it; if i has multiple
neighbours, then i can discriminate neighbours by sending different messages to each. We also
assume for simplicity that graphs are undirected. Finally, we assume that each agent knows n and
the identities of its neighbours in each round m, prior to sending messages in m.
2.1 Pairwise Exchanges
We consider an infinitely repeated game of pairwise exchanges of messages between neighbouring
agents. Given G ∈ G, at each round m, every two neighbouring agents i and j have values of interest
to each other. The goal is to persuade i and j to share these values plus some additional information
required to monitor other agents.
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Actions and histories. Agents i and j may exchange messages in one or more communication
steps. For simplicity, we abstract communication by considering a finite set of individual actions,
which capture most exchanges of interest, namely (1) defection, where i omits messages (and thus
passively punishes j), (2) cooperation, where i sends its value plus monitoring information to j, and
(3) active punishment, where i sends messages while causing a utility loss to j (for instance, if i sends
garbage instead of the value [18]). Our results can easily be generalized to arbitrary (finite) sets of
individual actions. In some of our results, we also consider that a punishment can be proportional
to some constant c, i.e., can cause a utility loss proportional to c; we also consider a fourth action of
punishment avoidance, where i avoids the cost of a punishment but does not receive the value from
j. Both punishment avoidance and proportional punishments are possible actions when multiple
communication steps occur between agents; later, we discuss possible implementations.
At every round m, i and j simultaneously follow an individual action, and are only informed
of each other’s individual actions at the end of the round. A round-m action ai of i specifies the
individual actions of i towards every neighbour. A round-m action profile ~a specifies the round-m
actions followed by all agents. When the adversary generates an evolving graph G ∈ G∗, repeated
pairwise exchanges are characterized by a set H(G) of histories. A round-m history h ∈ H(G) is a
pair ((~am
′
)m′<m, G) representing the sequence of action profiles ~a
m′ followed in rounds m′ < m and
the evolving graph G selected by the adversary. In other words, h represents global information
available immediately before agents follow round-m actions. A run r is a function mapping each
round m to a round-m history r(m) 2.
Given a round-m history h and G ∈ G, a protocol ~σ defines a probability distribution Pr~σ(r |
G, h) over every run r compatible with h and G (i.e., r(m) = h and G is the evolving graph in h).
Let Pr~σ(h | G) be the probability of history h being realized conditioned on G and agents following
~σ from the beginning. We say that r is a run of ~σ after h in G if Pr~σ(r(m′) | G, h) > 0 for every
round m′ > m. As an abuse of notation, we consider that Pr~σ(r | G, h) > 0. We say that r is a
run of ~σ in G if h is the initial history.
Information and Strategies. Information available to agents can be divided into knowledge
about the game structure and private observations. Regarding the former, we assume that the
main information about the game structure is common knowledge 3. We also assume that there
is a subset G∗ ⊆ G of evolving graphs that the adversary may generate and that is also common
knowledge. This does not preclude agents from believing that the adversary may generate any
evolving graph (i.e., G∗ = G); however, we show that we need minimum restrictions on G∗ to
persuade agents to exchange messages. Regarding the latter, given G ∈ G and round m, every
agent i acquires some information about Gm prior to sending messages in m, which includes the
identity of the round-m neighbours of i. We represent this information as a set Gmi of graphs, such
that Gm ∈ Gmi and, in every graph G¯ in Gmi agent i obtains the same information about G¯m and
Gm. For instance, if agents only know the identity of their neighbours, then Gmi is the set of graphs
where i has the same set of neighbours as in Gm.
Given a round-m history h, there is a private history hi of observations made by i up to the
beginning of round m, which include the sets Gm′i for every round m′ ≤ m, the actions of i in every
round m′ < m, and the individual actions followed by neighbours of i towards i in every round
m′ < m. We can associate to each private history hi a round-m information set Ii containing the
histories that provide the same information as in hi. Given G ∈ G, we denote by Ii(G) the set
of information sets of i compatible with G. We make the standard assumption that agents have
perfect recall, that is, agents recall all their observations made in the past. A strategy σi of agent i
2For every m′ < m, the sequence of actions in history r(m′) is a prefix of the sequence of actions in r(m).
3Every agent knows this, knows that every agent knows this, and so on.
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corresponds to a distributed protocol. Specifically, for each G ∈ G and information set Ii ∈ Ii(G),
σi(· | Ii) is a probability distribution over round-m actions available to i. We use the designation
protocol for strategy profiles ~σ, which specify the strategy followed by every agent.
Utility. When agents follow an action profile ~a, agent i obtains a utility ui(~a). This is the sum
of the utilities obtained in interactions with each neighbour j given as the difference between the
benefits of receiving a value from j and the costs of punishments and communication. Specifically,
whenever j follows a cooperation or punishment action and i does not avoid a punishment, i
obtains a benefit β of receiving j’s value. Regarding communication costs, i incurs a normalized
cost 1 of sending messages in cooperation and punishment actions, incurs no cost by defecting and
avoiding punishments, and incurs the cost α of receiving messages from j. Finally, a punishment
of j proportional to c causes a utility loss of cpi to i, where pi is the unitary cost per punishment.
We now define the (total) expected utility ui(~σ | G, Ii) of i when agents follow a given protocol
~σ, conditional on some G ∈ G∗ and on a round-m information set Ii. Given a round-m history
h ∈ Ii, ~σ defines a probability distribution over runs compatible with G and h. Therefore, we can
compute the expected utility of i in every future round m′ ≥ m conditional on G and h as the
expected value of ui(~a), where the expectation is taken relative to the probability defined by ~σ of
agents following action profile ~a in round m′. Informally, ui(~σ | G, Ii) is the expected value of ui(~a)
for every future round m′ ≥ m, as computed in round m. Formally, we need to take into account
both (1) the probability of each h ∈ Ii being realized and (2) the effect of time on the value of
future utilities. Regarding (1), we consider a belief system µ, specifying the probability µ(h | G, Ii)
that h is realized. Regarding (2), we follow the standard approach [19] of assuming that the value
of future utilities decays over time with a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), so the expected utility in round
m′ discounted to round m is δm′−mui(~a). Let ui(~σ | G, h) be the sum of the expected utilities ui(~a)
discounted to m for all future rounds m′ ≥ m, conditional on G and h; then, ui(~σ | G, Ii) is the
expected value of ui(~σ | G, h), where the expectation is taken relative to µ(h | G, Ii).
2.2 Enforcing Accountability
We say that a protocol ~σ enforces accountability iff (1) in ~σ, agents always cooperate by ex-
changing their values, until some agent deviates, and (2) ~σ is an equilibrium, so that no agent gains
by deviating. Regarding (2), we need to define a solution concept, specifying exact conditions under
which ~σ is an equilibrium.
Solution Concept. We define a new solution concept for our model, which is a refinement of
sequential equilibrium (SE) [14]. In its original definition, a protocol ~σ∗ is said to be a SE if there
is a belief system µ∗ consistent with ~σ∗ (see below) such that for every agent i and information
set Ii, i cannot gain by deviating from ~σ
∗ conditioning on Ii. We refine this definition by also
conditioning on every evolving graph G ∈ G∗ that may be selected by the adversary. Given this, if
~σ∗ is an equilibrium, then no agent i gains by deviating from σ∗i , regardless of the evolving graph
selected by the adversary and the observations made by i. This is sufficient for ensuring that agents
do not gain from not punishing other agents or not forwarding monitoring information triggering
additional punishments.
Formally, we say that ~σ∗ is a G∗-Oblivious Adversary Perfect Equilibrium (G∗-OAPE) iff there
is a belief system µ∗ consistent with ~σ∗ and G∗ such that, for every G ∈ G∗, agent i, strategy σi,
and information set Ii ∈ Ii(G), ui(~σ∗ | G, Ii) ≥ ui((σi, ~σ∗−i) | G, Ii), where the expectation is taken
relative to µ∗, and (σi, ~σ∗−i) is the protocol where only i deviates from σ
∗
i by following σi. The
definition of consistent beliefs is identical in spirit to that proposed in the definition of sequential
equilibrium [14]. We say that a belief system µ∗ is consistent with ~σ∗ and G∗ iff there is a sequence
~σ1, ~σ2, . . . of completely mixed protocols (attribute positive probability to every possible action at
every information set) converging to ~σ∗ such that for every G ∈ G∗, agent i, information set Ii ∈ Ii,
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and h ∈ Ii,
µ(h | G, Ii) = lim
c→∞Pr
~σc(h | G)/
∑
h′∈Ii
Pr~σ
c
(h′ | G).
Intuitively, given G, if Ii is consistent with agents following ~σ
∗, then i believes that agents followed
~σ∗, otherwise, i believes that they followed some alternative protocol.
3 Properties of G∗-OAPE
We prove the One-Shot-Deviation principle and a property of consistent beliefs regarding a
single deviation from a G∗-OAPE.
3.1 One-Shot-Deviation Principle
We find that the One-Shot-Deviation Principle holds for G∗-OAPE [11]. This principle states
that, for a ~σ∗ to be a G∗-OAPE, it suffices that no agent i can gain by performing a one-shot
deviation from σ∗i at any information information set Ii, where a one-shot deviation is a strategy
where i follows some action not specified by σ∗i and follows σ
∗
i afterwards. This principle will be
useful later, so we provide a proof. The proof is almost identical to [11], so we only include a sketch.
Let ~σ∗|Ii,ai be the protocol identical to ~σ∗, except i deterministically follows ai at Ii.
Proposition 1. One-Shot-Deviation Principle. A protocol ~σ∗ ∈ Σ is a G∗-OAPE if and only
if there exists µ∗ consistent with ~σ∗ and G∗ such that, for every G ∈ G∗, round m, agent i, round-m
Ii ∈ Ii(G), and actions a∗i , ai ∈ Ai(Gm), we have ui(~σ∗|Ii,a∗i | G, Ii) ≥ ui(~σ∗|Ii,a′i | G, Ii) | G, Ii).
Proof. (Sketch) We proceed as in [11], except that we fix G ∈ G∗. The implication is clear: since ~σ∗
is a G∗-OAPE, agent i cannot increase its expected utility by following ~σ∗|Ii,a′i instead of ~σ∗, and
ui(~σ
∗|Ii,a∗i | G, Ii) = ui(~σ∗ | G, Ii). As for the reverse implication, fix round-m Ii. Suppose that the
right-hand side of the proposition holds and that there is σi such that for some  > 0
ui((σi, ~σ
∗
−i) | G, Ii)− ui(~σ∗ | G, Ii) = 2. (1)
Define m′ > m such that δm′−myn/(1 − δ) < . Let σ′i be identical to σi at every round-m′′
information set for m′′ ≤ m′, but is identical to σ∗i at every round-m′′ information set for m′′ > m′.
It can be shown using the right-hand side and backwards induction that
ui(~σ
∗ | G, Ii) ≥ ui((σ′i, ~σ∗−i) | G, Ii) ≥ ui((σi, ~σ∗−i) | G, Ii)− .
This contradicts (1), proving the reverse implication and concluding the proof.
3.2 Single Deviation
We now show that the definition of consistent belief systems implies that, if an agent i has
been deviating from ~σ∗ up to round m and the round-m information set Ii is consistent with only
i deviating from ~σ∗, then i believes that only he deviated. Fix G ∈ G∗, belief system µ∗ consistent
with ~σ∗ and G∗, agent i, and round-m information set Ii ∈ Ii(G). We say that Ii is consistent with
only i deviating from ~σ∗ iff there is a strategy σ′i and history h ∈ Ij with Pr(σ
′
i,~σ
∗
−i)(h | G) > 0. Let
Pr~σ(~a | G, h) be the probability of agents following ~a conditioning on h and G.
Proposition 2. If Ii is consistent with only i deviating from ~σ
∗, then for all strategies σ′i consistent
with Ii and G (Pr
(σ′i,~σ
∗
−i)(h′ | G) > 0 for some h′ ∈ Ii) and all histories h ∈ Ii we have
µ∗(h | G, Ii) = Pr
(σ′i,~σ
∗
−i)(h | G)∑
h′∈Ii Pr
(σ′i,~σ
∗
−i)(h′ | G)
.
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Proof. Fix round-m h ∈ Ii. Let ~σ1, ~σ2, . . . be a sequence of completely mixed protocols that
converge to ~σ∗ such that
µ∗(h | G, Ii) = lim
c→∞
Pr~σ
c
(h | G)∑
h′∈Ii Pr
~σc(h′ | G) . (2)
Since agents follow each action with an independent probability, Pr~σ
c
(h | G) is the product of a
set of factors, with one factor Prσ
c
j (hj | G) per agent j corresponding to the probability defined
by ~σc of j following the sequence of actions specified in h. Specifically, this is the product of
σcj(a
m′
j | Im
′
j ) for every m
′ < m, where am′j is the round-m
′ action of j in h, and Im′j is the round-m
′
information set corresponding to h. The factor Prσ
c
i (hi | G) is the same for every h ∈ Ii. Let
Pr~σ
c
−i(h−i | G) be the product of the factors of agents different from i, and let I∗i be the subset
of histories from Ii where only i deviates from ~σ
∗. Since ~σc converges to ~σ∗, if h′ ∈ I∗i , then
limc→∞ Pr~σ
c
−i(h′−i | G) = Pr~σ
∗
(h′−i | G), and if h′ ∈ Ii \ I∗i , limc→∞ Pr~σ
c
−i(h′−i | G) = 0. Therefore,
for every h ∈ Ii, we have
µ∗(h | G, Ii) = limc→∞ Pr
σci (hi|G)Pr~σ
c−i (h−i|G)
limc→∞
∑
h′∈Ii Pr
σc
i (h′i|G)Pr
~σc−i (h′−i|G)
=
= limc→∞
Prσ
c
i (hi|G)
Prσ
c
i (hi|G)
Pr
~σ∗−i (h−i|G)∑
h′∈I∗
i
Pr
~σ∗−i (h′−i|G)
= Pr
~σ∗−i (h−i|G)∑
h′∈I∗
i
Pr
~σ∗−i (h′−i|G)
=
= Pr
σ′i (hi|G)
Prσ
′
i (hi|G)
Pr
~σ∗−i (h−i|G)∑
h′∈I∗
i
Pr
~σ∗−i (h′−i|G)
= Pr
(σ′i,~σ∗−i)(h|G)∑
h′∈Ii Pr
(σ′
i
,~σ∗−i)(h′|G)
.
This proves the result.
4 Key Concepts
In the proofs of our results, we identify multiple key concepts related to the properties of the
protocols and evolving graphs. We summarize them here for future reference.
Safe-bounded protocols. It turns out that it is relevant to our results to distinguish between safe
and non-safe protocols, and between bounded and non-bounded protocols. Regarding the former,
a protocol ~σ is safe if in every interaction agents either cooperate or punish each other, thus
never omitting messages. Otherwise, ~σ is non-safe. We show that in general non-safe protocols
are not G∗-OAPE. For this reason, we restrict some of our positive and negative results to safe
protocols. Regarding the latter, a protocol ~σ is bounded if the duration of punishments is bounded.
Specifically, every protocol can be represented as a state machine [22]; in a bounded protocol, (1)
the number of states is finite, (2) some of those states are cooperation states where all agents
cooperate, and (3) starting from an arbitrary state, the time of convergence to a cooperation state
is bounded. Bounded protocols are simpler to analyse and more useful in practice, since they
ensure that memory is bounded, which is an important requirement in dynamic networks. For
these reasons, we also restrict part of the analysis to bounded protocols.
Given an agent i, G ∈ G∗, round-m information set Ii ∈ Ii(G), and i-edge (j,m′) with m′ > m,
~σ defines a probability Pr~σ(j,m′ | G, Ii) of j punishing i at round m′. Let E~σ,ρ[Pi | G] be the
expected number of punishments of i in the next ρ− 1 rounds, defined as
E~σ,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] =
∑
i-edge (j,m′):m<m′<m+ρ
Pr~σ(j,m′ | G, Ii).
Proposition 3 shows that if beliefs are consistent with ~σ and G∗, the expected number of pun-
ishments may be conserved over time: if agent i expects to be punished an additional number c of
7
times after deviating in round m, and agents follow ~σ∗ afterwards, then i may still expect to be
punished c− k times after round m+ 1, where k is the number of round-m neighbours.
Fix a safe protocol ~σ, ρ > 0, belief system µ∗ consistent with ~σ and G∗, agent i, G ∈ G∗, strategy
σ′i where i does not deviate from σi in rounds m
′ > m, and round-m information set Ii ∈ Ii(G)
consistent with ~σ′ = (σ′i, ~σ−i) and G, such that E~σ
′,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] ≥ E~σ,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + c for some c > 0.
Given round-m history h and action profile ~a, let (h,~a) be the round-m + 1 history obtained by
appending ~a to the sequence of action profiles in h.
Proposition 3. There is round-m+ 1 I ′i ∈ Ii(G) such that
E~σ,ρ[Pi | G, I ′i] ≥ E~σ,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + c− k,
where k is the number of round-m neighbours of i.
Proof. By Proposition 2, we can write
E~σ′,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] =
=
∑
h∈Ii µ
∗(h | G, Ii)
∑
~a Pr
~σ′(~a | G, h)(Pi(~a) +
∑
r Pr
~σ(r | G, (h,~a))Pi(r,m)) ≤
≤ k +∑h∈Ii µ∗(h | G, Ii)∑~a Pr~σ′(~a | G, h)∑r Pr~σ(r | G, (h,~a))Pi(r,m) =
= k +
∑
I′i∈Ii(G,Ii,m+1)
∑
(h,~a)∈I′i Pr
~σ′(I ′i | G, Ii)µ∗((h,~a) | I ′i)
∑
r Pr
~σ(r | G, (h,~a))Pi(r,m) =
= k +
∑
I′i∈Ii(G,Ii,m+1) Pr
~σ′(I ′i | G, Ii)E~σ,ρ[Pi | G, I ′i].
(3)
where Ii(G, Ii,m + 1) is the set of round-m + 1 information sets compatible with Ii (for every
I ′i ∈ Ii(G, Ii,m+1) and (h,~a) ∈ I ′i, h ∈ Ii), Pi(~a) ≤ k is the number of punishments of i in ~a, Pi(r,m)
is the equivalent number of punishments that occur after round m in run r, and Pr~σ
′
(I ′i | G, Ii) is
the probability of I ′i being observed given Ii. In the second step, we used the fact that summing
over h ∈ Ii and round-m′ action profile ~a is equivalent to summing over I ′i ∈ Ii(G, Ii,m + 1) and
(h,~a) ∈ I ′i, and multiplying by the probability Pr~σ
′
(I ′i | G, Ii)µ∗((h,~a) | G, I ′i) of I ′i being reached
from Ii and the history being (h,~a). By Proposition 2, we have
Pr~σ
′
(I ′i | G, Ii)µ∗((h,~a) | G, I ′i) =
=
∑
(h′,~a′)∈I′
i
Pr~σ
′
((h′,~a′)|G)∑
h′∈Ii Pr
~σ′ (h′|G)
Pr~σ
′
((h,~a)|G)∑
(h′,~a′)∈I′
i
Pr~σ′ ((h′,~a′)|G) =
= Pr
~σ′ (h|G)∑
h′∈Ii Pr
~σ′ (h′|G)Pr
~σ′(~a | G, h) =
= µ∗(h | G, Ii)Pr~σ′(~a | G, h).
Equation (3) implies that there is I ′i ∈ Ii(G, Ii,m+ 1) such that
E~σ,ρ[Pi | G, I ′i] ≥ E~σ
′,ρ[Pi | G, Ii]− k ≥ E~σ,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + c− k.
This concludes the proof.
Punishment Opportunities. Roughly speaking, a punishment opportunity (PO) for an interac-
tion of agent i with j is a later interaction between an agent l and i where l has been informed of
a deviation of i towards j and thus has the opportunity to punish i. This requires the existence of
a temporal path (a sequence of causally influenced interactions) from j to l in the evolving graph
such that i cannot interfere with information forwarded from j to l. Formally, given G ∈ G∗ and
agent i, a round-m i-edge is a pair (j,m) where (i, j) is an edge in Gm. We say that j causally
influences l in G between m and m′ [15], denoted (j,m)  G (l,m′), if m < m′ and either j = l or
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there is a j-edge (o,m′′) in G such that (o,m′′)  G (l,m′). We say that j causally influences l in
G without interference from i between rounds m and m′, denoted as (j,m) Gi (l,m′), if the above
holds for o 6= i. A PO of i for (j,m) in G is an i-edge (l,m′) such that (j,m) Gi (l,m′).
Evasive strategies. Given a protocol ~σ∗, an evasive strategy σ′i for agent i is a strategy where
i first deviates from σ∗i by defecting some neighbours, and then hides this deviation from as many
agents as possible, for as long as possible.
Indistinguishable Evolving Graphs. We say that an evolving graph G is indistinguishable from
G′ to agent i at round m if i acquires the same information about G and G′, regardless of the
protocol followed by agents. Formally, given G ∈ G∗ and round m′ ≥ m, let Gm′j (G) be the set of
round-m′ graphs that provide the same the information to j about the round-m′ topology as Gm′ ,
and let Cm
′
i (G) be the set of agents j such that (j,m
′) G (i,m); G is indistinguishable from G′ to
i at m iff, for every round m′ ≤ m, Cm′i (G) = Cm
′
i (G
′) and Gm′j (G) = Gm
′
j (G
′) for all j ∈ Cm′i (G).
Proposition 4 shows the intuitive result that, if an evolving graph G is indistinguishable from
G′ to an agent j at round m′, then the probability of j observing each round-m information set
under any protocol is the same, whether the evolving graph is G or G′, even when conditioning on
an information set of another agent i. Given a run r, let rj(m
′) denote the round-m′ information
set Ij such that r(m
′) ∈ Ij .
Proposition 4. Given G,G′ ∈ G∗, agents i and j, round-m Ii ∈ Ii(G), and round-m′ Ij ∈ Ij(G),
if G and G′ are indistinguishable to j at m′, then for every protocol ~σ and belief system µ∗ consistent
with ~σ and G∗, we have∑
h∈Ii
µ∗(h | Ii)
∑
r:rj(m)=Ij
Pr~σ(r | G, h) =
∑
h∈Ii
µ∗(h | Ii)
∑
r:rj(m)=Ij
Pr~σ(r | G′, h).
Proof. Given a protocol ~σ, round m′′ ≤ m′, G′′ ∈ G∗, set Sm′′ of agents l such that (l,m′′)  G
(j,m′), and round-m′′ information set ISm′′ = ∩Il∈Sm′′ fixing the observations of agents in Sm′′ , let
Pr~σ(IS1 | G′′) =
∑
h∈ISm′′
Pr~σ(h | G′′). We can show that for every round m′′ and round-m′′ ISm′′ ,
we have
Pr~σ(ISm′′ | G) = Pr~σ(ISm′′ | G′).
At round 1, fix action profile ~aS1 . By definition of indistinguishable graphs, we have that all agents
in S1 have the same information about the round-1 topology in G and in G
′ and the same set of
neighbours. Therefore, we have
Pr~σ
∗
(IS1 | G) = Pr~σ
∗
(~aS1 | G) = Pr~σ
∗
(~aS1 | G′) = Pr~σ
∗
(IS1 | G′).
Now, fix ISm′′ . By the same reasons as above, agents in Sm′′+1 follow every action profile
~aSm′′+1 with a probability that depends only on ISm′′ and ~σ
∗. Since the probability of ISm′′ is the
same, whether the evolving graph is G or G′, and since ISm′′ and ~aSm′′+1 completely determine the
resulting information set ISm′′+1 , the inductive step holds.
By consistency of beliefs and the fact that j ∈ Sm′ , the result follows directly from the induction.
5 Enforcing Accountability with Weakest Adversary
We identify a necessary restriction on G for enforcing accountability, and provide a protocol that
enforces accountability assuming only this restriction and that pairwise exchanges are valuable.
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5.1 Need for Timely Punishments
The weakest restriction on G∗ is called timely punishments: it says that, for some bound ρ > 0,
and for every G ∈ G∗, agent i, and i-edge (j,m), there must be a PO (l,m′) of i in G for (j,m)
such that m′ < m + ρ. The need for this restriction is fairly intuitive. If the adversary is not
restricted by timely punishments, then there is G ∈ G∗ and an agent i such that either (1) for
some i-edge (j,m), there is no PO of i in G for that i-edge, or (2) there is no limit on the time
it takes between an interaction of i and a corresponding PO. In case (1), i can follow an evasive
strategy to ensure that no agent capable of punishing i learns about the defection, thus never being
punished. In case (2), i can delay a punishment for an arbitrarily long time; the problem here is
the discount factor δ: for an arbitrarily large constant d, there is an interaction of i such that, if i
defects the neighbour and later follows an evasive strategy, then i is only punished after d rounds,
and the utility loss of this punishment is discounted by δd; for a sufficiently large d, the immediate
gain of defecting outweighs the loss. Unfortunately, some real networks do not always admit timely
punishments. For instance, in a file sharing application, agents with similar interest may exchange
files frequently, but occasionally they may interact with agents with different interests. If agents i
and j have different interests and i happens to interact with j, then j may never be able to report
a defection of i to agents with interests similar to i, which may be the only timely PO’s of i.
Theorem 1 shows that timely punishments are necessary to enforce accountability. In the
proof, an agent i follows a single evasive strategy, which we now define. In a single evasive strategy,
agent i deviates from a strategy σi by defecting a neighbour j and then behaves as if i had not
deviated, such that the probability of neighbours of i not causally influenced by j observing each
information set is the same, whether i follows σ′i or σi.
Formally, we define a single evasive strategy σ′i inductively relative to a protocol ~σ. Let ~σ
′ =
(σ′i, ~σ−i). For every round m
′ < m, σ′i is identical to σi. At every round-m Ii ∈ Ii(G), with
probability σ∗i (a
∗
i | G1), i follows ai identical to a∗i except i defects j. After observing round-m+ 1
I ′i consistent with i following ai, i selects I
′′
i identical to I
′
i except I
′′
i is compatible with i following
a∗i at round m. Given m
′ ≥ m, round-m′ Ii ∈ Ii(G), and corresponding I ′i ∈ Ii(G) selected by i, i
follows ai with probability σi(ai | I ′i). After observing round-m′ + 1 I ′′i consistent with i following
a′i, i selects I
′′′
i compatible with I
′′
i (same observations by i prior to round m
′), and compatible
with the observations made by i in round-m′ in I ′′i . We show that, if there is no PO of i for (j,m)
in G up to round m′, then every neighbour of i in rounds between m and m′ makes observations
with the same probability, whether i follows σ′i or σi. Notice that now runs of ~σ
′′ also specify the
choices of information sets made by i prior to every round.
Fix round-m Ii ∈ Ii(G). Given history h ∈ Ii, round m′ ≥ m, set Sm′ of agents not causally
influenced by j between m and m′ in G, and round-m′ information set I∗Sm′∪i = ∩l∈Sm′∪iI
∗
l fixing the
observations of agents in Sm′ , let Q
~σ′(ISm′∪{i} | G, h) be the probability of agents in Sm′ observing
I∗Sm′ and i selecting I
∗
i . Lemma 1 shows that Q
~σ′(I∗Sm′∪{i} | G, h) is the same as the probability of
agents in Sm′ ∪ {i} observing ISm′∪{i} when they follow ~σ. Since there is no PO of i for (j,m) up
to round-m′, every neighbour of i is in Sm′ . This implies that every neighbour of i makes the same
observations between m and m′ with the same probability, whether i follows σ′i or σi.
Lemma 1. If there is no PO of i in G for (j,m) up to round m′, then for every h ∈ Ii, round
m′′ > m with m′′ ≤ m′, and round-m′′ information set ISm′′∪{i}, we have
Q~σ
′
(ISm′′∪{i} | G, h) =
∑
h′∈IS
Pr~σ(h′ | G, h). (4)
Proof. First, consider round m′′ = m+1 and fix h. Clearly, every agent different from i follows each
round-m action with the same probability, whether i follows σ′i or σi. In addition, when following
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σ′i, i selects a
∗
i with probability σi(a
∗
i | Ii), and sends messages according to a∗i except to j. Since
Sm+1 includes all agents but j and i, then every l ∈ Sm+1 makes each observation with the same
probability whether i follows σi or σ
′
i, and i selects each action with the same probability as if i
were following σi.
Now, suppose that the hypothesis holds for m′′ > m with m′′ < m′. Fix round-m′′ I1Sm′′∪{i}.
Since i has no PO for (j,m) up to m′′, for every agent l ∈ Sm′′+1 ∪ {i}, l ∈ Sm′′ ∪ {i}, so l
follows each action a∗l with probability σl(a
∗
i | G, I1l ). Moreover, every round-m′′ neighbour of l
is in Sm′′ ∪ {i}, hence, given ISm′′∪{i}, l makes observations in round m′′ (if l = i, i selects each
information set) with the same probability, whether i follows σi or σ
′
i. The result follows directly
from the hypothesis.
We can now prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. If the adversary is not restricted by timely punishments, then there is no protocol that
enforces accountability.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that ~σ∗ enforces accountability. Suppose also that
the adversary is not restricted by timely punishments. For every ρ > 0, we can fix G ∈ G∗, agent i,
and i-edge (j,m) such that, for every PO (l,m′) of i for (j,m) in G, we have m′−m ≥ ρ. This implies
that, for every round m′ ≥ m with m′ < m+ρ, and every i-edge (l,m′) with l 6= j, (j,m) G (l,m′)
is false, since the existence of a PO (l,m′) of i for (j,m) in G with m′ < m + ρ is equivalent to
the existence of one such (l,m′) with (j,m) G (l,m′). Let ρ be such that yδρ/(1− δ) < 1, where
y is the (bounded) maximum difference between utilities of a single interaction. Since σ∗i enforces
accountability, i is expected to cooperate at every round-m information set Ii ∈ Ii(G) consistent
with ~σ∗ and G. Here, i may follow a single evasive strategy σ′i relative to ~σ
∗, G, and (j,m) . Let
~σ′ = (σ′i, ~σ
∗
−i). By Lemma 1, for every round m
′ < m + ρ with m′ ≥ m, the round-m′ neighbours
of i observe each round-m′ + 1 information set with the same probability, whether i follows σ′i or
σ∗i . Since these information sets specify the individual actions followed by and taken towards i,
the expected utility of i in round m′ is the same, whether agents follow ~σ′ or ~σ∗, except i avoids
at least the cost 1 of defecting j in round m. Moreover, the maximum utility difference in every
round m′ ≥ m+ ρ is yn. Therefore, we have
ui(~σ
∗ | G, Ii)− ui(~σ′ | G, Ii) < −1 + δρyn/(1− δ) < 0.
This contradicts the assumption that ~σ∗ enforces accountability, concluding the proof.
5.2 A G∗-OAPE for Valuable Pairwise Exchanges with Timely Punishments
We now describe a safe-bounded protocol ~σval that enforces accountability in a setting of valu-
able pairwise exchanges (defined below), assuming an adversary restricted by timely punishments.
In valuable pairwise exchanges, we assume that agents can perform proportional punishments and
punishment avoidance actions. This implies that agents can punish each other with a cost propor-
tional to pi, and they can avoid such punishments at the expense of not receiving the value from
their neighbours. We also assume that the benefit-to-cost ratio of receiving/sending a value is high.
Specifically, we assume that β > 1 + α + ρpi and pi > n, where ρ is the constant in the definition
of timely punishments. In Section 5.2, we discuss exchanges that can be modelled in this way,
assuming that agents exchange multiple messages per round and neglect download costs (α = 0).
We now describe ~σval. In every round, agents exchange values and monitoring information that
includes accusations revealing defections. These accusations are disseminated across the network,
and used by agents to adjust the cost of a punishment applied to neighbours. More precisely, let ρ
be as in the definition of timely punishments. At the beginning of round m, agent i keeps for every
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agent l and round m′ ∈ {m − ρ . . .m − 1} a report indicating whether l defected some neighbour
in round m′. We call a report indicating a defection an accusation. In a round-m action, agents
i and j exchange their reports and values, and apply punishments proportional to the number of
accusations against each other. At the end of round m, i updates its reports relative to every l 6= j
and m′ < m if j does not defect i, otherwise i emits an accusation against j for round m.
Theorem 2 shows that ~σval enforces accountability in valuable pairwise exchanges. We make
two minimal assumptions: (1) the adversary is restricted by timely punishments, which as we have
seen is strictly necessary, and (2) agents are sufficiently patient, i.e., the factor δ is sufficiently close
to 1, which is a standard assumption in proofs of Folk Theorems, and is necessary for future losses
of punishments to always outweigh the gains of deviating in the present (recall that future losses
are discounted to the present by δ). The proof shows that a defection of i is always matched by
a punishment that occurs after at most ρ rounds. i gains at most n by defecting neighbours in a
round, while losing at least δρpi. Given that β > 1 + α + ρpi and pi > n, if δ is sufficiently close to
1, then the loss outweighs the gain. Moreover, if i avoids the cost of a punishment and of sending
and receiving messages (at most 1 + α + ρpi), i does not receive the value, thus losing β. Since i
can never influence the reports relative to itself, i never gains by deviating.
Theorem 2. If the adversary is restricted by timely punishments and agents are sufficiently patient,
then ~σval enforces accountability in valuable pairwise exchanges.
Proof. We show that ~σval is a G∗-OAPE. Fix G ∈ G∗, agent i, round-m, round-m information set
Ii ∈ Ii(G), h ∈ Ii, and actions a∗i , a′i such that σvali (a∗i |Ii) > 0. Fix G ∈ G∗, agent i, round-m,
round-m information set Ii ∈ Ii(G), h ∈ Ii, and actions a∗i , a′i such that σgeni (a∗i |Ii) > 0. Let
∆ = E~σ1(ui | h,G) − E~σ2(ui | h,G), where ~σ1 = ~σgen|Ii,a∗i , ~σ2 = ~σgen|Ii,a′i , and ~σgen|Ii,ai represents
the protocol that differs from ~σgen exactly in that i deterministically follows ai at Ii. By the One-
Shot-Deviation principle, it suffices to show that ∆ ≥ 0 to prove the result. For every m′ ≥ m, let
∆m
′
be the difference between the expected utility of i in round m′, between agents following ~σ1
and ~σ2, i.e.,
∆m
′
=
∑
r
Pr~σ
1
(r | G, h)ui(~am′)−
∑
r
Pr~σ
1
(r | G, h)ui(~am′),
where ~am
′
is the round-m′ action profile in r. We show the following facts, where again we say
that a fact holds after i follows ~a′i or ~a
∗
i if the fact holds for all runs r
1 and r2 in G of ~σ1 and ~σ2,
respectively:
(a) Fact 1 : If m′ ≥ m and i follows a′i, then j has an accusation against i for round m at the end
of m′ iff i defects a round-m neighbour l and (l,m) Gi (j,m′ + 1).
Proof. At the end of round m, an agent j has an accusation against i iff i defects j. The set of
neighbours that hold accusations are exactly the set of agents j such that (l,m) Gi (j,m+ 1),
where l is a round-m neighbour that i defects. Continuing inductively, at the end of every
subsequent round m′, an agent j has an accusation if j already had that accusation or received
it from l 6= i. Either way, by the induction hypothesis, this is only the case if i defected some
round-m neighbour l and (l,m) Gi (j,m′ + 1).
(b) Fact 2 : j has an accusation against i for m′′ 6= m at the end of round m′ ≥ m after i follows
a∗i iff the same is true after i follows a
′
i:
Proof. When m′ = m, agents ignore the accusations relative to i and m′′ sent by i in round m,
so the actions a∗i and a
′
i have the same impact on the accusations held by other agents after m
′.
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The same is true in every subsequent round m′ > m, except when m′ = m′′. In this case, since
i follows σvali in round m
′, both after following a∗i and a
′
i in round m, i defects no neighbour
and thus no agent will have an accusation against i relative to m′′ at the end of m′.
(c) Fact 3 : If m′ > m, then ∆m′ ≥ 0.
Proof. Since i follows σvali after m, in round m
′, i either cooperates with or punishes every
neighbour, and these actions have a fixed cost 1, whether i follows a∗i or a
′
i. Moreover, i always
receives the values from all neighbours, obtaining a benefit β and incurring a fixed cost α.
So, the utility in round m′ of i following a′i may differ from that of i following a
∗
i only if the
neighbours of i have a different number of accusations against i. By Facts 1 and 2, the number
of accusations when i follows a′i is at least as high as when i follows a
∗
i . This implies that
∆m
′ ≥ 0.
(d) Fact 4 : If i defects a neighbour in a′i, then there exists a round m
′ < m+ρ such that ∆m′ ≥ pi.
Proof. Suppose that i defects a neighbour j in a′i. There is a PO (l,m
′) of i for (j,m) in G
with m′ − m < ρ, such that (j,m)  Gi (l,m′). By Fact 1, l has an accusation against i for
round m when i follows a′i and no accusation relative to m when i follows a
∗
i . As in the proof
of Fact 3, i incurs the same costs of cooperating or punishing neighbours and obtains the same
benefit and incurs the same cost of receiving values, whereas i incurs the additional cost pi of
being punished by l when i follows a′i. Therefore, ∆
m′ ≥ pi.
We conclude by showing that ∆ ≥ 0. Suppose that in a′i agent i avoids punishments from
x neighbours and defects y neighbours. By avoiding a punishment from j, i avoids at most the
cost 1 + α + ρpi, but loses the benefit β, thus the variation in the utility of these interactions is
β− 1−α− ρpi > 0. By defecting j, i gains at most 1. This implies that ∆m ≥ −y. By Facts 3 and
4, we have
∆ ≥ δρpi − y ≥ δρpi − n.
By pi > n, if δ is sufficiently close to 1, ∆ ≥ 0, as we intended to prove.
5.3 Examples of Valuable Pairwise Exchanges
We now provide examples of interactions that meet the restrictions of valuable pairwise ex-
changes. First, we consider an interaction without cryptography. Then, we show how cryptography
can decrease the number of restrictions on the utility.
Without cryptography. Consider that every neighbouring agents i and j can exchange messages
in three phases per round and neglect download costs, which may be the case if bandwidth is
asymmetric. In phase 1, i send reports indicating the number cj of accusations against j, and
similarly j may send the equivalent number ci of accusations against i. In phase 2, i and j send
ci and cj penance messages that cost pi each, respectively. In phase 3, they exchange their values
only if both agents have sent all required information in previous phases. In this setting, agents
can adjust the size of penances such that pi > n. Suppose that the cost of sending phase 1, 2, and
3 messages is 1. If i sends all requested information in the first two phases, i does not avoid the
punishment of sending the ci penance messages, while avoiding at most the cost 1 of defecting j by
not sending the value in phase 3. As shown by Theorem 2, i does not gain from defecting. i can
avoid the punishment by not sending the requested messages in the first two phases, but in this
case i does not receive the value from j in phase 3, also not gaining from this deviation.
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With cryptography. The previous interactions require knowledge of β in order to appropriately
define the size of a penance message, and require β = Ω(nρ), making it restrictive in practice if n
is large. We can mitigate these problems using the technique of delaying gratification from [18].
Instead of exchanging values in phase 3 of round r, neighbours i and j exchange the values ciphered
with private keys in phase 1 along with monitoring information. In phase 2, they still send the
penances and in phase 3 they exchange the keys. As before, if messages are omitted in phase 1 or 2,
then the agents send no further messages. Let ακ be the cost of sending the key. This mechanism
only requires pi > αk and β > 1 +nρpi. Thus, it suffices that β > 1 + , where  = nρακ. If ακ  1,
then 1+ is close to the optimal restriction of β > 1. It is also possible to adjust pi without knowing
β: we can define the size of a penance to be larger than that of a key, but smaller than the value.
The arguments that show that this mechanism is a G∗-OAPE are the same as Theorem 2.
6 Enforcing Accountability in General Pairwise Exchanges
We now address the problem of enforcing accountability without making the assumption that
pairwise exchanges are valuable. We consider the least restrictive assumptions about utility and
individual actions available to agents. First, we consider the smallest benefit-to-cost ratio of receiv-
ing/sending values. We still need the benefit β to be larger than the total costs 1+α of sending and
receiving messages, or else agents would not have incentives to engage in exchanges. Second, we
do not assume that agents neglect download costs (α ≥ 0), nor that they communicate in multiple
steps. Therefore, proportional punishments and punishment avoidance are not available actions.
We still assume that agents can defect, cooperate, or (actively) punish other agents. Since there is
a trivial one-shot implementation of active punishments, where an agent sends garbage of the size
of the value instead of the value, we consider that a punishment causes a utility loss of pi ≥ β.
With this in mind, we say that a protocol enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges
if it is an equilibrium for all utilities such that β > 1 + α, and only has agents following the
three aforementioned actions. First, we show that non-safe protocols cannot in general enforce
accountability. Then, we identify a necessary and a sufficient condition for enforcing accountability
with safe-bounded protocols in general pairwise exchanges. The results are generalized for non-
bounded protocols in the full paper.
6.1 Need for Safe Strategies
Existing proofs of Folk Theorems devise protocols where agents provide the minimax utility in
punishments [19]. In pairwise exchanges, the minimax utility is 0, and is obtained when neighbour-
ing agents defect each other. With such strategies, deviations during punishments provide no gain
and hence require no further punishments. We identify two scenarios that illustrate problems of
applying minimax punishments in dynamic networks, which occur in both types of exchanges con-
sidered in this paper. The first scenario occurs when an agent i deviates and in a later interaction
with j agent i does not know whether j will punish i (in which case i is allowed to defect) or expects
i not to defect and triggers additional punishments if i defects. In the second scenario, an agent j
knows that a defection between l and i will occur, and j knows that if he defects another agent, then
any monitoring information triggering future punishments will be lost once l defects i. Although
these scenarios do not imply that we can never use non-safe strategies, they suggest that similar
problems may arise in general, thus non-safe strategies may require complicated mechanisms for
distinguishing between exchanges where there may and may not be defections. Since it is not clear
that such distinction can be made with bounded memory (agents may need to distinguish between
evolving graphs), we focus on safe strategies in the remainder of the paper.
6.1.1 Ambiguous Punishment Opportunities
Consider the scenario depicted in Fig. 2. There are five agents numbered 1 to 5, and two
evolving graphs G and G′ from G∗. In round 1, agent 1 interacts with agent 2, both in G and G′.
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5
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4
Figure 2: Ambiguous PO - G and G′ are indistinguishable to 1 at round 3.
In round 2, agent 2 interacts with agent 4 in G, whereas 2 interacts with agent 3 in G′. Finally, in
round 3 agent 1 interacts with agents 3 and 4 both in G and G′. Suppose that, if the adversary
selects G, then 4 is the only agent capable of punishing a defection of 1 towards 2 in a timely
fashion, and consider that after round 3, G′ forms a line where the edges to agent 1 always form a
cut between N1 = {2, 3} and N2 = {4, 5}, and the set of neighbours of 1 alternates between {3, 4}
and {2, 5}. Notice that G′ admits timely PO’s for every agent i and i-edge. If the only information
about the graph topology available to agents in each round is the set of their neighbours, then 1
cannot distinguish between G and G′ at round 3. Suppose that there is a protocol ~σ∗ that enforces
accountability and requires a mutual defection between 1 and 4 if 1 defects 2. In G, since ~σ∗ is a
G∗-OAPE, 1 obtains a higher utility for defecting 4. Now, consider that the adversary selects G′,
and consider the two cases where (a) 1 defects 2 in round 2 and defects 4 because 1 is following σ∗1,
and (b) 1 does not deviate from σ∗1 in round 2 and deviates in round 4 by defecting 4. Agent 1 can
devise an evasive strategy where 1 cooperates with 4 and 5 and hides the defection towards 2 from
them, such that agents 4 and 5 never punish 1. On the other hand, if i follows σ∗i and defects 4
in round 3, then either 4 or 5 must later punish 1, because they cannot distinguish between cases
(a) and (b), and in case (b) they are the only agents capable of punishing 1 for the defection. This
implies that 1 obtains a strictly higher utility of cooperating with 4 rather than following σ∗i and
defecting 4, contradicting the assumption that ~σ∗ enforces accountability.
Formally, given agents i, j and G,G′ ∈ G∗, we say that there is a round-m partition of G′
regarding i and j if there is a partition (N1,N2) of N \ {i} satisfying (1) j ∈ N2, (2) for every
two i-edges (l,m′) and (o,m′′) in G′, (l,m′)  G′i (o,m′′) only if l and o are in the same set of the
partition, and (3) for every i-edge (l,m′) with m′ < m, we have l ∈ N1. We say that i-edge (j,m)
in G ∈ G∗ is an ambiguous PO iff there is G′ ∈ G∗ such that G′ is indistinguishable to i from G at m
and there is a round-m partition (N1,N2) of G′ regarding i and j. We say that ~σ∗ has ambiguous
defections iff there is G ∈ G∗, agent i, and ambiguous i-edge (j,m) in G such that σ∗i requires i to
defect j at some information set Ii ∈ Ii(G) consistent with only i deviating from ~σ∗, i.e., there is
σ′i 6= σ∗i such that Ii is consistent with (σ′i, ~σ∗−i) and G.
Theorem 3 proves that a ~σ∗ that has ambiguous defections cannot be a G∗-OAPE. The proof
uses the notion of dual evasive strategy, which we now define. In a dual evasive strategy σ′′i , i
cooperates with an agent j in round m where (j,m) is an ambiguous PO, and tries to convince
agents from the two disjoint sets N1 and N2 that i is following two different strategies σ′i and σ∗i ,
respectively, where, in σ′i, i defects some agents from N1 and follows σ∗i afterwards. This way, i
hides the defections from the agents in N2, while not revealing to agents in N1 that i is hiding the
defections from agents in N2. The idea of σ′′i is similar to a single evasive strategy: after round m,
i sends messages to agents in N2 as if i did not defect any agent, and sends messages to agents in
N1 as if i were following σ′′i .
Specifically, suppose that i-edge (j,m) is an ambiguous PO, and fix corresponding G, G′, ~σ∗,
~σ′, and Ii, such that ~σ∗ has an ambiguous defection, Ii is a round-m information set consistent with
~σ′ and G, and in ~σ′ only deviates from σ∗i , and only deviates before round m. We define a dual
evasive strategy σ′′i as follows. For every round m
′ < m or information set I ′i incompatible with Ii,
~σ′′ is identical to ~σ∗. The definition of σ′′i for the remaining information sets is inductive. At every
round m′ ≥ m, σ′′i specifies a probability distribution over a pair of round-m histories (h1, h2) and
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round-m actions followed by i. Intuitively, h1 is used to emulate the behaviour of agents in N1 and
h2 is used to emulate the behaviour of agents in N2.
Consider round m. Since G′ is indistinguishable from G at m, we have Ii ∈ Ii(G′) and Ii is
consistent with ~σ′ and G′. Agent i selects a round-m history h1 ∈ Ii with probability Pr~σ∗(h1 |
G′)/
∑
h′∈I′i Pr
~σ∗(h′ | G), where I ′i is some round-m information set consistent with ~σ∗ and G. In
addition, i selects h2 with probability Pr~σ
′
(h2 | G′)/∑h′∈Ii Pr~σ∗(h′ | G′). Now, consider round
m′ ≥ m, and suppose that ~σ′′ is defined for every previous round. Fix a pair (h1, h2) selected at the
end of m′ − 1. At round m′, agent i does the following. First, i selects two action profiles ~a1N2∪{i}
and ~a2N1∪{i} with probabilities Pr
~σ∗(~a1N2∪{i} | G′, h2) and Pr~σ
∗
(~a2N1∪{i} | G′, h1), respectively. These
are the actions that agents in N2 and N1 could have followed had i followed σ∗i at Ii and σ∗i from
the beginning, respectively. Then, i follows individual actions towards agents in N1 according to a1i
and follows individual actions towards agents in N2 according to a2i . After observing round-m′ + 1
information set I ′i, i deterministically selects two action profiles ~a
1
N1 and ~a
2
N2 such that the round-
m′ individual actions followed by agents in N1 towards i in I ′i are the same as those followed by
these agents in ~a1N1 , and the same holds for agents in N2 and ~a2N2 . Let ~a1 = (~a1N1 ,~a1N2∪{i},~a1N2)
and ~a2 = (~a2N1∪{i},~a
2
N2). The selected round-m
′+ 1 histories are (h1,~a2) and (h2,~a1), where (h′,~a′)
represents the history that results from appending ~a′ to the sequence of action profiles in h′. This
concludes the definition.
We prove Lemma 2, which shows that by following ~σ′′, agent i leads agents in N1 to believe that
i follows σ∗i at Ii, and lead agents in N2 to believe that all agents followed ~σ∗ since the beginning.
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1.
Given round-m′ history h, let Q~σ′′1 (h | G′, Ii) be the probability of h specifying the actions
followed by agents in N2 conditional on Ii, and the actions of other agents in h being the same as
in the round-m history h1 selected by i. Let Q~σ
′′
2 (h | G′, Ii) denote the corresponding probability
regarding the actions of agents in N1 and selection of h2. Fix µ∗ consistent with ~σ∗ and G∗.
Lemma 2 shows that Q~σ
′′
1 (h | G′, Ii) is the same as the belief held by i that the round-m′ history
will be h conditional on G′, some information set I ′i consistent with ~σ
∗ and G′, and agents following
~σ∗. Since h determines the observations of agents in N2, this implies that i believes that these
agents will not detect the deviations of i. Similarly, Q~σ
′′
2 (h | G′, Ii) is the same as the belief held
by i that the round-m′ history will be h conditional on G′, Ii, and agents following ~σ∗, hence i
believes that agents in N1 will not detect a deviation of i from ~σ∗ at and after Ii.
Lemma 2. For every round m′ ≥ m and round-m′ h ∈ H, there is a round-m information set I ′i
consistent with ~σ∗ and G′ such that
Q~σ
′′
2 (h | G′, Ii) =
∑
h′∈Ii
µ∗(h′ | G′, Ii)Pr~σ′(h | G′, h′),
Q~σ
′′
1 (h | G′, Ii) =
∑
h′∈I′i
µ∗(h′ | G′, I ′i)Pr~σ
∗
(h | G′, h′).
Proof. We first show for Q~σ
′′
2 (h | G′, Ii), using induction on m′.
Consider m′ = m. By the definition of ambiguous PO (j,m), for every l ∈ N1, o ∈ N2, and
m′ < m, it is false that (l,m′)  G′ (o,m) and (o,m′)  G′ (l,m). Since i does not interact with
agents inN2, the actions of agents inN2 do not depend on the actions of agents inN1∪{i}, and their
probability is given by ~σ∗. Similarly, the actions of agents in N1 do not depend on the actions of
agents in N2, and their probability is given by ~σ′. This implies that the belief held by i conditional
on G′ and Ii that the actions of agents in N2 are given by h is the same as the probability of these
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agents following those actions, conditional on G′, Ii, and agents following ~σ∗; by construction of σ′′i ,
this is exactly the probability of i selecting those actions. Moreover, the actions of i selected by i in
h are fixed by Ii; clearly, these are the same as the actions followed by i conditional on G
′ and Ii.
Finally, by Proposition 2, the belief that agents in N1 follow the actions specified in h conditional
on G′ and Ii is exactly the probability that those agents followed those actions, conditional on G′,
Ii, and agents following ~σ
′. Therefore, we have µ∗(h | G′, Ii) = Q~σ′′2 (h | G′, Ii), as we intended to
prove.
Now, assume the hypothesis for round m′ and consider round-m′ + 1 history (h,~a). We have
Q~σ
′′
2 ((h,~a) | G′, Ii) = Q~σ
′′
2 (h | G′, Ii)Pr~σ
∗
(~a | G′, h),
which directly implies the result by the hypothesis. To see this, notice that, if h represents the
actions taken by agents in N1 and the selection of h2, then hN1∪{i} specifies the observations
of agents in N1, so they follow ~aN1 with probability Pr~σ
∗
(~aN1 | hN1∪{i}), i.e., the product of the
probabilities σ∗l (al | Il) for l ∈ N1, where Il is the round-m′ information set, which, by the definition
of ambiguous PO, is determined by the actions hN1∪{i} of agents in N1 ∪ {i}. Conversely, i selects
~aN2∪{i} with probability Pr
~σ∗(~aN2∪{i} | G′, hN2∪{i}).
The proof for Q~σ
′′
1 (h | G′, Ii) is identical, except we revert the roles of N1 and N2, and i initially
selects I ′l consistent with ~σ
∗ and G′. This concludes the proof.
We can now prove Lemma 3.
Theorem 3. If ~σ∗ has ambiguous defections, then ~σ∗ does not enforce accountability.
Proof. Fix a belief system µ∗ consistent with ~σ∗ and G∗. Fix G, i, and an ambiguous (j,m).
Suppose that σ∗i (a
D
i | Ii) > 0, where Ii ∈ Ii(G) is a round-m information set consistent with G
and a protocol ~σ′ = (σ′i, ~σ
∗
−i), a
D
i ∈ Ai(Gm) is an action where i omits a message to j, and σ′i is
some strategy identical to σ∗i in every round m
′ ≥ m. Consider G′ indistinguishable from G to i
at m as in the definition of ambiguous PO (j,m), and corresponding partition (N1,N2). Since the
i-edges form a cut between agents in N1 and in N2 in G′, i can control all the information that flows
between agents from the two sets. More precisely, i can follow a dual evasive strategy σ′′i such that
by Lemma 2 agents in N1 observe each information set with the same probability, whether i follows
σ′′i and σ
∗
i at Ii, and agents in N2 observe information sets consistent with agents following ~σ∗ from
the beginning. This implies that, when i follows σ′′i at Ii and the evolving graph is G
′, the expected
utility of i obtained in interactions with agents in N1 is the same as when i follows σ∗i (identical to
σ′i at Ii). Regarding interactions with agents l ∈ N2, both i and l cooperate if i follows σ′′i . Now,
suppose that for some h ∈ Ii with µ∗(h | G′, Ii) > 0, and run r with Pr~σ∗(r(m′′) | G′, h) > 0 for
every m′′ > m, an agent l ∈ N2 does not cooperate with i in r. Then, the expected utility of i
following σ∗i obtained in interactions with agents in N2 is strictly lower than if i always cooperated
with those agents by following σ′′i , so we have
ui(~σ
∗ | G′, Ii) < ui((σ′′i , ~σ∗−i) | G′, I ′i).
Thus, ~σ∗ does not enforce accountability.
Now, consider that when i follows σ∗i at Ii agents in N2 never punish i. Fix round-m information
set I ′i consistent with ~σ
∗ and G′. Suppose that ~σ∗ enforces accountability. Then, at I ′i, i must
cooperate with j according to σ∗i . Given that i gains 1 by defecting j, there must be a utility loss in
future interactions if i deviates from σ∗i by defecting. However, i may follow a dual evasive strategy
σ′′′i at I
′
i, where i is never punished. More precisely, i can behave towards agents in N2 as if the
information set were Ii and i followed σ
∗
i such that by assumption agents in N2 always cooperate
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with i. In σ′′′i , i can also behave towards agents in N1 as if i followed σ∗i at I ′i, such that these
agents also cooperate with i. Hence, i obtains a strictly higher utility by following σ′′′i instead of
σ∗i at I
′
i. Again, ~σ
∗ cannot enforce accountability. This concludes the proof.
6.1.2 Unsafe Defections
Fix a bounded protocol ~σ∗ that enforces accountability, and let ρ be the maximum convergence
time from an arbitrary state to a cooperation state. Suppose that, in order to avoid the problem
of ambiguous defections, ~σ∗ never requires an agent i to defect j if j did not deviate from ~σ∗.
Consider a scenario with three agents numbered 1 to 3, where, agent 1 interacts with 2 and 3 in
round 1, agent 2 interacts with 3 in round ρ− 1, and agent 3 interacts with 1 in round ρ. Suppose
that (1) if 1 defects 2 or 3 in round 1, then the only timely opportunity to punish 1 is in round ρ,
and (2) if 2 defects 3 in round ρ− 1, then monitoring information revealing this defection to agents
that may punish 2 must be forwarded by 3 to 1 (e.g., due to all temporal paths crossing this edge).
Consider that ~σ∗ requires 3 and 1 to mutually defect in round 3 as a punishment for a defection
of 1 in round 1. Notice that ~σ∗ still requires 2 to not defect 3. After the defection of 1, if agent 2
knows that 3 will defect 1, regardless of whether 2 defects 3, then 2 will always gain from defecting
3, since any monitoring information revealing this defection to other agents is lost when 3 defects
1. Instead, suppose that 3 does not defect 1 after a defection of 2. Now, we may have another
problem: if 3 defects 1, its future neighbours may never learn from the defection of 2, thus believing
that agents followed ~σ∗ after round 1. Since the system converges to a cooperation state after ρ,
future neighbours of 3 may never punish 3 for defecting 1, in which case 3 gains from defecting 1,
and ~σ∗ cannot enforce accountability.
Formally, given ρ, agents i, j, j′, and l, rounds m and m′, and G ∈ G∗, a temporal path in G
from i-edge (j,m) to j′-edge (l,m′) is a sequence of c tuples (jk, jk+1,mk) such that (1) for every
k ≤ c, jk 6= i, (j,m) G (jk,mk), and (jk, jk+1) is an edge in Gmk , and (2) jc+1 = l and mc < m′.
We say that G is unsafe if there exist rounds m,m1,m2, agents i, j, l, i-edges (j,m), (l,m2), and
j-edge (l,m1), such that (1) l has no interactions after round m2 and prior to round m + ρ, and
(2) (l, i,m2) is in all temporal paths from every j-edge (l,m1) to all j-edges after round m1 and
i-edges after round m2. A protocol ~σ∗ is said to avoid ambiguous punishments iff for every set
S of agents, protocol ~σS followed by agents in S, G ∈ G∗, agents i /∈ S and j, information set
Ii ∈ Ii(G) consistent with (~σS , ~σ∗−S) and G, and h ∈ Ii, ~σ∗ requires j to not defect i at h. Fix
an unsafe G ∈ G∗ and corresponding agents i, j, l and rounds m,m1,m2. Given a protocol ~σ∗ that
avoids ambiguous punishments, let σ′i be a strategy where i deviates from σ
∗
i exactly by defecting
all round-m neighbours. We say that ~σ∗ has an unsafe defection iff in every run r of (σ′i, ~σ
∗
−i) in G,
agent l defects i at round m2.
Theorem 4 shows that no bounded protocol ~σ∗ that enforces accountability can have an unsafe
defection if beliefs are reasonable in the following sense. µ∗ provides the simplest possible explana-
tion to deviations, by considering the smallest set of agents that deviated and the simplest deviating
strategy that explains the observations. Specifically, fix G ∈ G∗, agent i, and round-m information
set Ii. We define µ
∗(· | G, Ii) as follows. Agent i deterministically selects the smallest set S of
agents for which there is a completely mixed protocol ~σ′S such that Ii is consistent with (~σ
′
S , ~σ
∗
−S)
and G. Given S, i deterministically selects a protocol ~σ′S such that, for each agent l ∈ S, l deviates
in the least number of rounds, and, if l deviates in round m, then l follows the same individual
action towards all round-m neighbours. It is easy to see that µ∗ is consistent with ~σ∗ and G∗. We
just need to establish a total order regarding the protocols (~σ′S , ~σ
∗
−S), from the protocol with largest
S and largest number of deviations per agent, to ~σ∗, using some criteria to order protocols with
the same size of S and same number of deviations per agent such as the order of the identities of
agents and round numbers when agents deviate. Every such protocol is completely mixed, and the
18
sequence converges to ~σ∗.
The proof of Lemma 4 uses the notion of lenient evasive strategy, defined as follows. In a lenient
evasive strategy, agent i ignores a defection of some other agent j towards i at round m, while still
ensuring that no future neighbour of i notices that i ignored the defection of j. Such strategy allows
i to take advantage of an unsafe defection in an interaction with l; if the strategy σ∗i requires i to
defect l iff j does not defect i, then i can gain by deviating from σ∗i by defecting l such that no
agent will punish i in the future.
Formally, consider an unsafe evolving graph G ∈ G∗, and fix corresponding agents i, j, l and
rounds m,m1,m2. Fix also a corresponding ~σ∗ that has unsafe omissions, fix ~σ′ where exactly i
deviates from ~σ∗ by defecting all round-m neighbours, and fix round-m2 information set Il ∈ Il(G)
consistent with protocol ~σ′′ and G, where in ~σ′′ exactly i and j deviate from ~σ∗ by defecting all
round-m and round-m1 neighbours, respectively. We define a strategy σ′′′l similar to single evasive
strategies, where l pretends that j did not defect at round m. Specifically, let Sm′ be the set of
agents o not causally influenced in G by round-m1 neighbours of j between m1 and m′, and let
Om′ be the set of remaining agents o for which there is an l-edge (o
′,m′′) with m′′ > m2 and
(o,m′)  G (o′,m′′). Let Lm′ = Sm′ ∪ Om′ ∪ {i}. Let I ′l be an information set identical to Il in
terms of the actions followed agents in Lm′ \{i}, and consistent with ~σ′ and G. In σ′l, at round m2,
agent l selects I ′l and follows actions with probability σ
∗
l (· | I ′l), defecting i. For every m′ > m2,
fix round-m′ information set Il and corresponding I ′l previously selected by l. At Il, agent l follows
actions with probability distribution σ∗l (· | I ′l). Given round-m′+ 1 information set I ′′l , l selects I ′′′l
compatible with I ′l and with the round-m
′ observations in I ′′l . We prove Lemma 3, which shows
that, for all rounds m′ > m2, both l and neighbours of l follow actions consistent with ~σ′, using
similar arguments to the proof of Lemma 1.
Let ~σ′′′ = (σ′′′l , ~σ
∗
−l). Notice that runs of ~σ
′′′ also specify the selections of information sets by l.
We still use the same notation for runs. Given a run r, an information set ILm′ compatible with r
specifies the observations of agents in Lm′ \ {l} and the selections of l. We show in Lemma 3 that
for all runs r of ~σ′′′ and m′ > m2, and round-m′ information set ILm′ ∈ ILm′ (G) compatible with r,
ILm′ is consistent with ~σ
′. By the definition of unsafe G, every round-m′ neighbour of i is in Lm′ ,
so every neighbour of i believes that agents followed ~σ′ after m.
Lemma 3. Suppose that beliefs are reasonable. For every round m′ ≥ m2, history h ∈ Il with
µ∗(h | G, Il) > 0, and run r of ~σ′′ after h in G, the round-m′ information set ILm′ compatible with
r is consistent with ~σ′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on m′. Consider m′ = m2. Fix h ∈ Il with µ∗(h | G, Il) > 0.
Since beliefs are reasonable and h is consistent with ~σ′′ and G, µ∗(h | G, Ii) is given by conditioning
on agents following ~σ′′. Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 1, we can show that
for every agent o ∈ Sm′ , the information set Io corresponding to h is consistent with ~σ′. Moreover,
since every temporal path from round-m1 j-edges to l-edges after m2 crosses (l, i,m2), we have
Om′ = ∅. Finally, l selects I ′l , which is consistent with ~σ′ by construction. This proves the base
case.
Now, suppose that the hypothesis holds for m′ ≥ m2 and fix round-m′ history h′ such that
there is h ∈ Il with µ∗(h | G, Il) > 0 and Pr~σ′(h′ | G, h) > 0. Let I ′l be the round-m′ information
set selected by l. Fix ~a′ with Pr~σ′(~a′ | G, h′) > 0. Every agent o ∈ Lm′ follows ao with probability
σ∗o(al | Io) if o 6= i, where h ∈ Io, or o follows ao with probability σ∗o(ao | I ′l) if o = l. Since Io and
I ′l are consistent with ~σ
′ and G, ~a′ is also consistent with ~σ′ (which is equivalent to ~σ∗ after m)
and G. By definition of unsafe G, for every o ∈ Lm′+1 \ {i}, the round-m′ neighbours of o are in
Lm′ , so the round-m
′ + 1 information set I ′o corresponding to (h,~a) is consistent with ~σ′ and G.
In addition, l selects I ′′l compatible with I
′
l and the actions of the round-m
′ neighbours of l in ~a.
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Since every round-m′ neighbour of l is also in Lm′ , I ′′l is consistent with ~σ
′ and G. This concludes
the proof.
We can now prove Lemma 4.
Theorem 4. If ~σ∗ is bounded and has unsafe defections and beliefs are reasonable, then ~σ∗ does
not enforce accountability.
Proof. Suppose that beliefs are reasonable and that ~σ∗ has unsafe omissions, and fix corresponding
G ∈ G∗, i, j, l, m, m1, and m2. Fix a reasonable belief system µ∗. We show that ~σ∗ is not a
G∗-OAPE with µ∗.
Let σ′i be a strategy that differs from σ
∗
i exactly in that i defects all round-m neighbours, and
let ~σ′ = (σ′i, ~σ
∗
−i). Since ~σ
∗ avoids ambiguous punishments, i must not defect j and l at round-m
information sets consistent with ~σ∗ and G (and with ~σ′). This implies that, in every run r of ~σ′
in G, prior to round m1, both j and l know that i deviated from σ∗i . That is, for all o ∈ {j, l},
round-m1 information set Io ∈ Io(G) consistent with ~σ′ and G, and history h ∈ Io, agent i deviates
from σ∗i in h at round m, by defecting o. This implies that in the definition of µ
∗, the set S must
include i, and i must deviate by defecting all round-m neighbour.s Since Io is consistent with ~σ
′ and
G, the simplest explanation for Io is that exactly i deviated by defecting all round-m neighbours,
so µ∗(h | G, Io) is defined by conditioning on G and agents following ~σ′.
Let σ′′j be an evasive strategy where j deviates from σ
∗
j by defecting l at m
1, and later j behaves
as if j did not defect l. Let ~σ′′ = (σ′i, σ
′′
j , ~σ
∗
−i,j). First, suppose that in every run of ~σ
′′ agent l
still defects i at round m2. Fix round-m1 Ij consistent with ~σ
′ and G. We can show that if agents
follow ~σ′′, then for every round m′ > m1, j-edge (o,m′), and round-m′ information set Io ∈ Io(G),
we have∑
h∈Ij
µ∗(h | G, Ij)
∑
r:ro(m′)=Io
Pr~σ
′′
(r | G, h) =
∑
h∈Ij
µ∗(h | G, Ij)
∑
r:ro(m′)=Io
Pr~σ
′
(r | G, h), (5)
where ro(m
′) is the round-m′ information set with r(m′) ∈ ro(m′). To see this, given round
m′ > m1, let Sm′ be the set of agents o such that (l,m1)  G (o,m′) is false. We can show using
the same arguments as Lemma 1 that (5) holds for every m′ > m and o ∈ Sm′ . Since G is unsafe,
every neighbour of j up to round and including m2 is in Sm′ . This proves (5) for m
′ ≤ m2.
Now, let Om′ be the set of agents o such that, for some o
′ and m′′ < m′, (o′, o,m′′) is in a
temporal path from round-m1 j-edges to j-edges after m1. We can show using induction that (5)
also holds for every m′ > m2 and o ∈ Om′ . Since G is unsafe, for every round m′ > m2, l cannot
be in Om′ and every round-m
′ neighbour of j is in Sm′ ∪Om′ . This implies (5) for all j-edge (o,m′)
with m′ > m1.
We now prove the induction. First, consider m′ = m2 + 1. By definition of unsafe G, we have
Om′ = {i} and i ∈ Sm′ . As we have seen before, in runs of ~σ′ and ~σ′′ in G, i observes each round-m2
information with the same probability, and, since i follows σ∗i after round m, i also follows each
round-m2 action with the same probability. The same applies to all round-m2 neighbours of i,
except l. However, since l always defects i, it holds that i observes each round-m2 + 1 information
set with the same probability, whether agents follow ~σ′ or ~σ′′. This proves (5) for m′ = m2 + 1.
Continuing inductively, for every o ∈ Om′+1, by the definition of unsafe G, both o and every round-
m′ neighbour of o are in Sm′ ∪ Om′ , so the result follows from the same arguments as above and
the hypothesis.
Now, suppose that there is a round-m1 information set Il ∈ Il(G) consistent with ~σ′′ such that
l does not defect i. In every run of ~σ′ in G agent j must not defect l at m1. This implies that at
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Il agent l knows that both i and j deviated from σ
∗
j . Again, µ
∗(· | G, Il) is defined by conditioning
on ~σ′′. As shown in Lemma 3, l may follow a lenient evasive strategy σ′′′l such that in every round
m′ > m2 the neighbours of l behave as if if all agents followed ~σ′ after m. Since ~σ∗ and ~σ′ are
equivalent after m, and since the system stabilizes to a cooperation state by round m+ ρ and l has
no interactions after m2 and prior to m+ρ, in every interaction after m2 between l and a neighbour
o, both l and o cooperate. Thus, the expected utility in all future interactions is β − 1 − α when
l follows σ′′′l . If l follows σ
∗
l at Il, then the expected utility in all of those interactions is at most
β − 1− α. Since l gains at least 1 by defecting i at Il, l gains by deviating from σ∗l at Il, hence ~σ∗
cannot enforce accountability. This concludes the proof.
6.2 Need for Eventual Distinguishability
We identify a necessary restriction on G∗ to enforce accountability with safe-bounded protocols
in general pairwise exchanges, called eventual distinguishability. Later, we generalize the results to
safe (possibly non-bounded) protocols. Roughly speaking, we say that the adversary is restricted by
eventual distinguishability if for every evolving graph G in G∗ and agent i, eventually i stops having
interactions in G where i defects some neighbour j, and then expects to be punished by two or more
agents for that defection, because each of those agents cannot distinguish between two evolving
graphs where it should and should not punish i. If the adversary is not restricted by eventual
distinguishability and agent i keeps defecting its neighbours, then the number of punishments that
i expects to receive in future rounds grows unboundedly with time. Consequently, the protocol
cannot be bounded, since there is no bound on the time it takes for punishments to end after
agents stop deviating.
Specifically, the formal definition of eventual distinguishability has two parts: (1) a definition
of indistinguishable rounds, in which a defection of some agent is matched by more than one future
punishment, and (2) the requirement that indistinguishable rounds must eventually stop occurring.
Fig. 3 depicts an example of an indistinguishable round. There are three agents numbered 1 to 3.
The adversary may generate three alternative evolving graphs G1, G2, and G3. In round 1, agent
1 interacts with agent 2. In round 2, agent 2 interacts with agents 3. In round 3, the interactions
depend on the evolving graph: (G1) i interacts only with 2, (G2) i interacts only with 3, and
(G3) i interacts with both 2 and 3. In every safe protocol that enforces accountability in general
pairwise exchanges, 1 must send a message to 2 in round 1, so 1 gains by defecting 2. Suppose
that round 3 is the only opportunity to punish i for defecting 2 in round 1 in a timely fashion.
In an equilibrium protocol, the immediate gain 1 of defecting must be lower than the future loss
β of being punished (or else 1 would gain by deviating). Since β can be arbitrarily close to 1 4, 1
must be (deterministically) punished by 2 in G2 and must be punished by 3 in G3 (in which case,
2 must inform 3 of the defection of 1 in round 2). Suppose that agents only know the identities of
their neighbours. Then, neither agent 2 can distinguish G3 from G1 nor can agent 3 distinguish
G3 from G2 at round 3. Thus, they both have to punish 1 in G3, and the expected number of
punishments must increase by 2, even though 1 only defects one neighbour. This shows that there
is a round-2 information set I1 ∈ I1(G3) such that, according to the information in I1 available
to 1, the expected number of punishments of 1 conditional on G3 and I1 is 2. If this type of
interactions keeps occurring in G3, then, for an arbitrarily large number c, there is an information
set I1 ∈ I1(G3) such that, basing on the information in I1, agent 1 expects to be punished by at least
c neighbours after I1. The fact that only agent 1 deviates plays a key role here: by the definition
of equilibrium, we only need to ensure that 1 never gains by defecting a neighbour at round 1
provided that other agents do not deviate afterwards. If multiple agents deviate after round 1 (e.g.,
agent 2 defects 3 in round 2), then 1’s defection in round 1 can be forgiven, since such behaviour
4Recall that we only assume that β > 1 + α and α can be small.
21
21 3
G1,  G2,  G3
21 3
G1,  G2,  G3
12 3
G1
12 3
G2
12 3
G3
Round  3Round  2Round  1
Figure 3: G3 is indistinguishable from G1 (G2) to 2 (3) at round 3.
is unexpected at the time 1 decides to defect 2 in round 1. The assumption that protocols are
safe is also crucial, since non-safe protocols are not susceptible to the aforementioned problem.
Unfortunately, we cannot in general devise a non-safe protocol that enforces accountability.
We now provide a rigorous definition of an adversary restricted by eventual distinguishability.
Given an evolving graph G, agent i, and constant ρ, let ΦGρ (m) be the set of PO’s (l,m
′) of i in G
for i-edges (j,m′′) such that m′′ ≥ m. We say that round m is (G, i, ρ)-indistinguishable iff there
are two evolving graphs G1, G2 ∈ G∗ such that (1) for every G′ ∈ {G1, G2} and (j,m′) ∈ ΦG′ρ (m),
G′ is indistinguishable from G to j at m′, (2) |ΦG1ρ (m) ∩ ΦG
2
ρ (m)| < k where k is the number of
i-edges in round m, and (3) ΦG
1
ρ (m) ∪ ΦG
2
ρ (m) = Φ
G
ρ (m). We say that the adversary is restricted
by eventual distinguishability iff there is a constant ρ > 0 and a round m∗ such that for all G ∈ G∗
and agent i, every round m > m∗ is not (G, i, ρ)-indistinguishable.
This definition has two parts: (1) the definition of (G, i, ρ)-indistinguishable round and (2) the
requirement that, eventually, no round is (G, i, ρ)-indistinguishable. We have already explained
that (2) is necessary to keep punishments bounded. Part (1) is a generalization of the scenario
depicted in Fig. 3 for the worst-case scenario where some agent always defects its neighbours. To
understand its definition, recall that the problem identified in the example was that there were two
different agents 2 and 3 who were responsible for punishing 1 in a timely fashion, after 1 defected
2 in round 1, in evolving graphs G1 and G2, and who could not distinguish a third evolving graph
G3 from G1 and G2, respectively. More generally, this happens when, for some agent i, round m,
and bound ρ on the delay of punishments, (1) there are sets S1 and S2 of agents responsible for
punishing i in G1 and G2, respectively, in the ρ rounds after i defects some (or all) neighbours in
round m (in our example, S1 = {2} and S2 = {3}), (2) S1 and S2 do not intersect, and (3) for
l = 1, 2, no agent in Sl can distinguish G
3 from Gl. We further generalize this intuition by showing
that the problem arises even if S1 and S2 intersect; they just cannot intersect in more than k agents,
where k is the degree of i in round m. We also show that, if S1 and S2 contain all the agents that can
punish i no later than ρ rounds after m, then no protocol can avoid the aforementioned problem.
Given that we are considering the worst-case scenario where i always defects its neighbours, this is
exactly the case when S1 and S2 are the agents in Φ
G1
ρ (m) and S2 = Φ
G2
ρ (m), respectively.
To see this, notice that when i defects a round-m neighbour j, if (l,m′) is a PO of i for (j,m),
then l can clearly learn of the deviation of i and punish i in round m′, so l is an agent capable of
punishing i for defecting a round-m neighbour. However, since i may also defect other agents in
rounds after m, these are not the only agents capable of punishing i for a defection in round m.
Consider the following scenario where the neighbours of i in m and m+ 1 are j and j′ respectively.
Consider three PO’s of i: (1) (l1,m1) is a PO for both (j,m) and (j′,m+ 1), (2) (l2,m2) is a PO
for (j′,m+ 1) but not (j,m), and, similarly, (3) (l3,m3) is a PO for (j′,m+ 1) but not (j,m). In
this case, we can devise a punishment scheme were i is punished at least once for each defection,
and at most twice for defecting both j and j′: (i) if i only defects j, then only l1 punishes i; and
(ii) if i defects j′, then l2 and l3 punish i, whereas l1 does not punish i, whether i defects j. (ii)
is possible, because l1 can be informed of the defection of i towards j′. In this case, we can say
that i is punished for defecting j by l2, even though (l2,m2) is not a PO of i for (j,m); it is a PO
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for an i-edge from a round m′ > m. In other words, in general, i may be punished for defecting a
round-m neighbour by an agent l, in round m′, if (l,m′) is a PO of i for some i-edge (j′,m′) with
m′ ≥ m. So, the set of i-edges corresponding to agents that may punish i for defecting a round-m
neighbour in evolving graph G, in the ρ rounds after m, is exactly ΦGρ (m).
Theorem 5 proves the need for eventual distinguishability, in order to devise safe-bounded
protocols that enforce accountability in general pairwise exchanges. Fix a safe protocol ~σ∗ that
enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges, fix a belief system µ∗ consistent with ~σ∗ and
G∗, and let ρ be the maximum time it takes for ~σ∗ to converge to a cooperation state.
The proof is divided into three parts. First, we show in Lemma 4 that when agent i defects k
neighbours in a round the expected number of punishments in the next ρ− 1 rounds must increase
at least by k. Then, Lemma 6 shows that, if i constantly defects all neighbours and the adversary
is not restricted by eventual distinguishability, then the expected number of punishments of i grows
without bound. Finally, in the proof of Theorem 5, we identify a contradiction between Lemma 6
and the requirement of self-stabilization in bounded time.
Lemma 4. For every G ∈ G∗, agent i, information set Ii ∈ Ii(G), and protocol ~σ′ = (σ′i, ~σ∗−i)
where i omits messages to k neighbours at Ii and follows σ
∗
i afterwards, we have
E~σ
′,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] ≥ E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + k.
Proof. Suppose that there is G, i, Ii, and ~σ
′ where i omits messages to k neighbours at Ii and
E~σ
′,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] < E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + k. (6)
At Ii, i avoids the cost k of sending messages by following σ
′
i instead of σ
∗
i , whereas the expected
benefits and costs of receiving messages and being punished in round m are the same, whether i
follows σ∗i or σ
′
i. In every round m
′ > m and interaction with round-m′ neighbour j, both i and
j either cooperate with or punish each other, given that ~σ∗ is safe. Thus, i incurs the fixed cost
1 + α of sending and receiving messages, and the expected utility loss of following σ′i instead of σ
∗
i
in an interaction with j is upper bounded by the probability of j punishing i times the maximum
loss of β. Let S be the largest set of i-edges such that ∆(j,m′) > 0 for every (j,m′) ∈ S, where
∆(j,m′) = Pr~σ′(j,m′ | G, Ii)− Pr~σ∗(j,m′ | G, Ii). Since ~σ∗ is self-stabilizing in at most ρ rounds,
for every (j,m′) ∈ S, we have m′ −m < ρ, and
ui(~σ
′ | G, Ii)− ui(~σ∗ | G, Ii) ≥
≥ k −∑(j′,m′)∈S δm′−m∆(j′,m′)β ≥
≥ k −∑(j′,m′)∈S ∆(j′,m′)β ≥
≥ k − (E~σ′,ρ[Pi | G, Ii]− E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii])β.
(7)
By (6) and the assumption that ~σ∗ is independent of the utilities, there is a value of β > 1
sufficiently close to 1 such that, for some G and Ii, the utility difference between i following σ
′
i and
σ∗i is strictly positive, regardless of the value of δ, so i gains by deviating from σ
∗
i at Ii. This is a
contradiction to ~σ∗ being a G∗-OAPE for every β > 1, thus proving the result.
The following lemma is useful in the proof. Let σ′i be a strategy where i defects round-m
neighbours but follows σ∗i afterwards. We show that, if (l,m
′) is not a PO of i in G for i-edges
(j,m′′) with m′′ ≥ m, then (l,m′) never learns from the round-m defections of i.
Lemma 5. For every round m′ > m with m′ ≤ m, set S of agents l 6= i such that (l,m′) is not a
PO of i in G for i-edges between m and m′, and round-m′ information set IS = ∩l∈SIl, we have∑
h∈Ii
µ∗(h | G, Ii)
∑
h′∈IS
Pr~σ
′
(h′ | G, h) =
∑
h∈Ii
µ∗(h | G, Ii)
∑
h′∈IS
Pr~σ
∗
(h′ | G, h). (8)
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Proof. Fix m′ and S. We have that for all l ∈ S and i-edge (j,m), (j,m)  G (l,m′) is false and
i does not interact with l prior to m′. Given round m′′, let Sm′′ be the set of agents l such that
(l,m′′) is not a PO of i in G for i-edges between m and m′′. At every round m′′ > m with m′′ < m′,
the information set observed by agents in Sm′′ , depends only on the actions of agents not in Sm′′−1.
Using this fact, it is direct to show the result by induction on m′′.
We can now prove Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. If the adversary is not restricted by eventual distinguishability, then there exist G ∈ G∗
and agent i such that for every c > 0, there is Ii ∈ Ii(G) such that
E~σ
∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] ≥ c.
Proof. Suppose that the adversary is not restricted by eventual distinguishability. There is G ∈
G∗, i, and an infinite sequence of rounds m1,m2, . . . such, that for every k, mk is not (G, i, ρ)-
distinguishable. Given round m, let ~σ′ = (σ′i, ~σ
∗
−i) be the protocol where i always defects up to
and including round m, and follows σ∗i afterwards. By Lemma 4, for every G
′ ∈ G∗ and round-m
information set Ii ∈ Ii(G),
E~σ
′,ρ[Pi | G′, Ii] ≥ E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G′, Ii] + k, (9)
where k is the number of round-m neighbours of i. By Proposition 5, only agents agents in ΦG
′
ρ (m)
vary the probability of punishing i, hence we have
E~σ
′,ρ[Pi | G′, Ii] = E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G′, Ii] +
∑
(j,m′)∈ΦG′ρ (m)
∆(j,m′).
In particular, this is true for m = mk and G
′ ∈ {G1, G2} such that (1) for every (j,m) ∈ ΦG′ρ (m),
G′ is indistinguishable from G to j at m, (2) |ΦG1ρ (m)∩ΦG
2
ρ (m)| < k, and (3) ΦG
1
ρ (m)∪ΦG
2
ρ (m) =
ΦGρ (m). By Proposition 4, every such j must punish i with the same probability both in G and G
′,
because G′ is indistinguishable from G to j at m, so by (9) we can write
E~σ′,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] =
= E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii]+
+
∑
(j,m′)∈ΦG1ρ (m) ∆(j,m) +
∑
(j,m′)∈ΦG2ρ (m) ∆(j,m)−
−∑
(j,m′)∈ΦG1ρ (m)∩ΦG2ρ (m) ∆(j,m) ≥
≥ E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + 2k − (k − 1) ≥
≥ E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + k + 1.
By Proposition 3, there is round-m+ 1 I ′i ∈ Ii(G) such that
E~σ
′,ρ[Pi | G, I ′i] ≥ E~σ
∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + k + 1− k ≥ E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + 1.
This implies that, after every round mk, there is an information set such that the expected number
of punishments of i increases by at least 1 if i follows σ′i, while it does not decrease after every other
round. It is easy to show using induction that, for every round m, there is a round-m information
set Ii ∈ Ii(G) such that the expected number of punishments of i at Ii is at least k∗, where k∗ is
the largest k with mk < m. We can have k
∗ to be arbitrarily large, by arbitrarily increasing m,
hence the result follows.
24
Finally, we prove Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. If the adversary is not restricted by eventual distinguishability, then there is no safe-
bounded protocol that enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that the adversary is not restricted by eventual
distinguishability. By Lemma 6, there is G and i such that for every c > 0, there is a round m and
round-m Ii ∈ Ii(G) such that E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] ≥ c. This is true for m large enough such that c is
larger than the number of i-edges between m and m+ ρ. This is a contradiction to ~σ∗ converging
to a cooperation state in ρ rounds.
6.3 Need for Distinguishability in Non-bounded Protocols
We now prove a slightly weaker result than the previous section, for the more general case of safe
but possibly non-bounded protocols. We show that, in order to enforce accountability in general
pairwise exchange protocols, the adversary must be restricted by frequent distinguishability, which
we now define. As in the definition of eventual distinguishability, frequent distinguishability has two
parts: (1) the definition of indistinguishable round, and (2) the requirement that indistinguishable
rounds do not occur frequently, where by frequently we mean they keep occurring at every interval
of c rounds for some constant c. Part (1) is the same as in eventual distinguishability. Part (2)
differs exactly in that indistinguishable rounds may occur infinitely often, but interval between two
consecutive indistinguishable rounds cannot be bounded. Formally, we say that the adversary is
restricted by frequent distinguishability iff for every constant c > 0, there is ρ > 0 such that, for
all G ∈ G∗, and agent i, there is a sequence of c consecutive rounds in G that are not (G, i, ρ)-
indistinguishable.
Theorem 6 proves the need for frequent distinguishability. The proof is almost identical to that
of Theorem 5, in that we show by contradiction that, if the adversary is not restricted by frequent
distinguishability, then the expected number of punishments of some agent is unbounded. The only
difference is that, in every indistinguishable round, the expected number of punishments grows by
1−  for an arbitrarily small .
We first show that, for an arbitrarily small  > 0, there is a sufficiently large delay ρ such
that, if i deviates from a safe equilibria protocol ~σ∗ at round m by first defecting k neighbours,
the expected number of punishments in the next ρ rounds must be higher by at least k −  than
following ~σ∗.
Lemma 7. For every  > 0, there is ρ > 0 such that, for all G ∈ G∗, agent i, information set
Ii ∈ Ii(G), and protocol ~σ′ = (σ′i, ~σ∗−i) where i omits messages to k neighbours at Ii and follows σ∗i
afterwards, we have
E~σ
′,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] ≥ E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + k − .
Proof. By contradiction, if the Lemma is false, then there exists  > 0 such that, for an arbitrarily
large ρ, we have
E~σ
′,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] < E~σ∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] + k − .
By following σ′i, i gains k while losing at most δ(k − )β in the next ρ rounds. In the rounds after
m+ ρ, i loses at most β per round. Therefore, the utility difference is at most
k − δβ(k − + δ
ρ
1− δ ).
The constant ρ can be arbitrarily large so that  > δρ/(1− δ), since  and δ are constant on ρ. If
this is the case, then i gains by following σ′i, and ~σ
∗ cannot be a G∗-OAPE. This is a contradiction,
concluding the proof.
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We now prove that, if the adversary is not restricted by frequent distinguishability, then the
expected number of punishments of some agent is unbounded.
Lemma 8. If the adversary is not restricted by frequent distinguishability, then, for every ρ > 0,
there is G ∈ G∗ and agent i such that for every b > 0, there is Ii ∈ Ii(G) such that
E~σ
∗,ρ[Pi | G, Ii] ≥ b.
Proof. Suppose that the adversary is not restricted by frequent distinguishability. There exists
c > 0 such that, for every ρ, there is i and G such that frequently, i.e. at most every c rounds, some
round is (G, i, ρ)-indistinguishable. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4, we can show using Lemma 7
that, if i keeps defecting its neighbours, then the expected number of punishments grows 1 − 2
every (G, i, ρ)-indistinguishable round, while decreasing at most  in other rounds, for an arbitrarily
small . This means that, every period of c rounds, the expected number of punishments grows
′ = 1− 2− (c− 1) = 1− (c+ 1).
Since c is constant on ρ, we can find ρ large enough and  small enough such that  < 1/(c + 1),
in which case ′ > 0. This shows that the expected number of punishments is unbounded, as we
intended to prove.
We can now conclude with the proof of Theorem 6.
Theorem 6. If the adversary is not restricted by frequent distinguishability, then there is no safe
protocol that enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges.
Proof. By Lemma 8, if the adversary is not restricted by frequent distinguishability, then for an
arbitrarily large ρ, there is G and i such that the expected number of punishments of i in the ρ
rounds following any round is unbounded. In particular, for an arbitrarily large ρ, there is Ii ∈ Ii(G)
such that the expected number of punishments in the ρ rounds after Ii is larger than the number
of i-edges, and i interacts with some neighbour j at Ii, so i cannot be punished for defecting j at
Ii in the next ρ rounds. This is a contradiction to Lemma 7, concluding the proof.
6.4 A G∗-OAPE for General Pairwise Exchanges with Connectivity
We introduce a restriction of connectivity on G∗ that ensures that the adversary is restricted by
eventual distinguishability and is sufficient for devising safe protocols that enforce accountability in
general pairwise exchanges. To understand this condition, it is useful to first recall the scenario of
Figure 3. In this scenario, the problem arises because neither agent 2 can distinguish G1 from G3 at
round 3 nor agent 3 can distinguish G2 from G3 at round 3, and thus they cannot coordinate their
actions to punish 1 only once. This problem can be avoided if agents can learn the degree of their
neighbours prior to deciding whether to punish them. However, the knowledge of the degree is not
sufficient to satisfy eventual distinguishability, since for instance we may have a scenario similar to
the one depicted in Figure 3 where agents 2 and 3 do not interact with 1 in the same round and
cannot communicate with each other to coordinate the punishments. This can be avoided if it is
always the case that either 2 and 3 interact in the same round with 1 or the first agent to interact
with 1 can causally influence the other without interference from 1. More generally, it suffices that,
for every G ∈ G∗, agent i, and round m, there is ρ such that the round-m neighbours of i causally
influence every round-m+ ρ neighbour of i between m and m+ ρ without interference from i. This
condition is exactly met with ρ = n when G∗ is restricted by a condition similar to 1-connectivity
from [15]: we say that the adversary is restricted by connectivity iff agents know the degree of their
neighbours and, for every G ∈ G∗, agent i, and round m, the graph obtained from Gm by removing
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the edges to i is connected. This condition is also met by overlays for gossip dissemination such
as [18, 17, 9].
We now define a safe-bounded protocol ~σgen that enforces accountability in general pairwise
exchanges, assuming that the adversary is restricted by connectivity. Fix G ∈ G∗ and let degmi
denote the degree of i in Gm. At every round m, neighbouring agents always exchange monitoring
information, and they follow punishment individual actions with a probability proportional to
past deviations. Monitoring information includes reports and numbers of pending punishments.
Specifically, for each round m′ < m and pair of agents (j, l), a report relative to m′ and (j, l)
specifies whether j interacted with l in round m′, and whether l defected j. For each c ∈ {1 . . . n}
and agent j, agents keep the number of pending punishments to be applied to j in periodic rounds
(c+kn)k≥0. Before interacting with j in round m, i determines whether j should be punished. For
this, i updates the number x of pending punishments for the period that includes m. If m ≤ n,
then x = 0. Otherwise, let x′ be the previous number of pending punishments resulting from an
identical update prior to round m−n. Given the round-m−n reports, i determines degm−nj . Then,
i sets x to max(0, x′−degm−nj ), and adds degm−nj iff j defected some neighbour in m−n. i punishes
j with probability min(1, x/degmj ). (This is where the knowledge of degree comes into play.) After
the interaction, i emits a report indicating that the interaction occurred in round m and signalling
whether j defected i. i also updates its monitoring information basing on the information sent by
its neighbours. For each report relative to round m′ < m not older than m− n+ 1 and pair (k, l),
if i does not have a report relative to m′ and (k, l) and receives a new report from j 6= l, then i
stores this report. In addition, for each period c not including m, i updates the number of pending
punishments relative to every l 6= i and c to the maximum between its value and the value sent by
every neighbour j 6= l, capping it to lie in {0 . . . n− 1}.
We present in Alg. 1 the pseudo-code for the strategy σgeni of agent i. We use two variables:
AP and RP. For each round m, i keeps a number APmj of pending punishments to be applied to
j in rounds m,m+ n,m+ 2n, . . ., initially equal to 0 and never larger than n− 1. Also, i keeps a
report RPmjl ∈ {Good,Bad,⊥} per pair of nodes (j, l) and round r signalling whether in round m:
(i) j did not interact with l (⊥); (ii) l interacted and defected j (Bad); or (iii) l interacted and did
not defect j (Good). RPmjl is initialized to ⊥. Notice that these variables can be implemented by a
finite state machine: at each round m, agents only need to store and forward information relative
to each tuple (i, j, c) for c ∈ {0 . . . n−1}, corresponding to RPm−cij , and information relative to each
pair (i, c) for c ∈ {0 . . . n− 1}, corresponding to APm−ci . For the sake of exposition, we opt to not
represent the state in this compact form.
This definition has the following properties when agents follow ~σgen at every round-m history
h: (1) i cannot influence monitoring information that determines punishments applied to i, (2) we
match each defection of i in round m to at least one punishment in future rounds, (3) a defection
in round m triggers additional punishments to be applied in rounds m+ n,m+ 2n . . ., and (4) the
delay of additional punishments is bounded by O(n2). (1) ensures that i does not gain from lying
about monitoring information. (2) ensures that, even if i saves the cost 1 of sending messages, i
loses at least β > 1. (3) and (4) guarantee that this loss is discounted to the present by a lower
bounded factor δn
2
. This implies that, if agents are sufficiently patient (i.e., δ is sufficiently close
to 1), then i prefers not to defect.
Theorem 7 shows that ~σgen enforces accountability with connectivity and sufficiently patient
agents.
Theorem 7. If the adversary is restricted by connectivity and agents are sufficiently patient, then
~σgen enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges.
Proof. We show that ~σgen is a G∗-OAPE in general pairwise exchanges. Fix G ∈ G∗, agent i, round-
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Algorithm 1 σgeni
1: for all j,m do
2: APmj ← 0
3: for all l do
4: RPmjl ← ⊥
5: Upon round m
6: for all neighbour j do
7: pr ← min(1,APmj /degmj )
8: With probability pr, cooperate . Punishment
9: Otherwise, punish . Cooperation
10: End
11: After round m
12: for all neighbour j do
13: if j defects i in m then
14: RPmij ← Bad
15: else
16: RPmij ← Good
17: for all m′ ∈ {m− n+ 1 . . .m− 1} do
18: APm
′
j ← maximum between APm
′
j and values sent by each l 6= j
19: Cap APm
′
j to lie in {0 . . . n− 1}
20: for all l 6= i do
21: if RPm
′
lj = ⊥ and some k 6= j sent RPm
′
lj |k 6= ⊥ then
22: RPm
′
lj ← v 6= ⊥ deterministically selected among received values
23: for all agent j 6= i do
24: if m ≥ n then
25: deg← #{l 6= j | RPm−n+1lj 6= ⊥} . Degree degm−n+1j
26: APm+1j ← max(0,APm−n+1j − deg)
27: if exists l 6= j such that RPm−n+1lj = Bad then
28: APm+1j ← APm+1j + deg
29: End
m, round-m information set Ii ∈ Ii(G), h ∈ Ii, and actions a∗i , a′i such that σgeni (a∗i |Ii) > 0. Let
∆ = E~σ1(ui | h,G) − E~σ2(ui | h,G), where ~σ1 = ~σgen|Ii,a∗i , ~σ2 = ~σgen|Ii,a′i , and ~σgen|Ii,ai represents
the protocol that differs from ~σgen exactly in that i deterministically follows ai at Ii. By the One-
Shot-Deviation principle, it suffices to show that ∆ ≥ 0 to prove the result. For every m′ ≥ m, let
∆m
′
be the difference between the expected utility of i in round m′, between agents following ~σ1
and ~σ2, i.e.,
∆m
′
=
∑
r
Pr~σ
1
(r | G, h)ui(~am′)−
∑
r
Pr~σ
1
(r | G, h)ui(~am′),
where ~am
′
is the round-m′ action profile in r. We prove six facts first, which hold for every run of ~σ1
and ~σ2 in G, conditioned on h. We say that a fact holds after i follows ~a′i and ~a
∗
i if the fact holds for
all runs r1 and r2 of ~σ1 and ~σ2, respectively, such that Pr~σ
1
(r1 | G, h) > 0 and Pr~σ2(r2 | G, h) > 0.
Fix agents j and l different from i, and rounds m′,m′′. Let RPmij |l,m′ and APmi |l,m′ be the values
of RPmij and AP
m
i |l,m′ , respectively, deterministically held by l at the end of round m′ in every run
of the considered strategies:
(a) Fact 1: If i follows a′i, then RP
m
ij |l,m′ is accurate: (1) if i and j do not interact or it does not
hold that (j,m)  Gi (l,m′ + 1), then the report says that they did not interact; (2) if i and j
interact and (j,m) Gi (l,m′ + 1), the the report says that i defected j iff i defected j in a′i.
Proof. At the end of round m, the report of l says that i and j interacted iff l = j and i and
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j are neighbours. This is exactly the case when (j,m)  Gi (l,m + 1). Moreover, (2) follows
directly by construction of ~σgen. In every subsequent round m′, agent l updates RPmij |l,m′ to
RPmij |l,m′+1 only if RPmij |l,m′ = ⊥ and some round-m′ neighbour o sent RPmij |o,m′ 6= ⊥. By the
hypothesis, RPmij |o,m′ is accurate, so it follows that RPmij |l,m′+1 is also accurate.
(b) Fact 2: If m′ = m+ n− 1 and i follows a′i, then APm
′+1
i |l,m′ = y + max(x− degmi , 0), where x
is the maximum of APmi |o,m for all agents o 6= i, and y = degmi if i defects a neighbour in a′i or
y = 0 otherwise.
Proof. It is easy to show using induction that for every roundm′′ ∈ {m. . .m′}, APmi |l,m′ = xm
′′
,
where xm
′′
is the maximum of APmi |o,m for all agents o 6= i such that (o,m)  Gi (l,m′′ + 1).
This is clearly true for m′′ = m, since only l is causally influenced by l between m and m+ 1.
For every other m′′, l updates APmi |l,m′′ to the maximum of the values sent by round-m′′ − 1
neighbours (Lines 1.13-22), which by the induction hypothesis is xm
′′
. Since the adversary is
restricted by connectivity, l is causally influenced by every agent of i without interference from
i between m and m+ n, so APmi |l,m′ = x. After updating APmi |l,m′ , l computes the value deg,
which by Fact 1 is degmi , sets AP
m′+1
i |l,m′ = min(0, x − degmi ), and adds degmi if some report
indicates that i defected some neighbour, which by Fact 1 is true iff i defected some neighbour
in a′i. This proves Fact 2.
(c) Fact 3: If m′′ 6= m and m′ ≥ m, then the values of APm′′i |l,m′ and RPm
′′
ij |l,m′ when i follows a′i
are the same as when i follows a∗i .
Proof. If m′ = m and m′′ < m, then those values depend only on the values received by l
from agents different from i, which are determined by the history h. Continuing inductively,
for every m′ > m., l updates APm
′′
i |l,m′ and RPmij |l,m′ according to the values sent by round-m′
neighbours o 6= i of l, which are the same by the hypothesis, so the resulting values of APm′′i |l,m′
and RPmij |l,m′ are the same, whether i follows a′i or a∗i . If m′′ > m, then l does not update
APm
′′
i |l,m′ and RPmij |l,m′ when m′ < m′′. When m′ = m′′ − 1, l updates APm
′′
i |l,m′ basing on
the values APm
′′−n
i |l,m′ and RPm
′′−n
ij |l,m′ , which are the same by the proof of the case m′′ < m.
When m′ = m′′, l updates RPm
′′−n
ij |l,m′ iff l interacts with j in round m′′, and updates it to
Good, whether i follows a′i and a
∗
i , since i follows σ
gen
i after m and does not defect l. Finally,
when m′ > m′′, the same arguments as above prove the result.
(d) Fact 4: If m′ > m, then the value APm
′′
i |l,m′ is at least as high when i follows a′i as when i
follows a∗i .
Proof. First, consider that m′′ < m. By Fact 3, the values are the same whether i follows a′i
or a∗i . Consequently, the same holds for all rounds m
′′ + cn with c > 0. Regarding m′′ = m,
by Fact 2, the value APm
′′
i |l,m′ is higher by degmi when i follows a′i than a∗i if i defects some
neighbour in a′i, or is the same otherwise. Again, the result follows directly from Fact 3 for all
rounds m+ cn with c > 0.
(e) Fact 5: If m′ > m, then ∆m′ ≥ 0.
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Proof. In round m′, both i and its neighbours either cooperate or punish each other, so the
benefits and communication costs are the same, whether i follows a′i or a
∗
i . By Fact 4, i is never
punished with higher probability when i follows a∗i than when i follows a
′
i, hence the expected
costs of punishments must be at least as high when i follows a′i as when it follows a
∗
i . This
implies that ∆m
′ ≥ 0.
(f) Fact 6: If i defects some neighbour in a′i, then
∑
m<m∗<m+n2 ∆
m∗ ≥ βdegmi .
Proof. Let mc = m + cn for c ≥ 0, and let APmci |o,mc−1,a∗i and APm
c
i |o,mc−1,a′i be the value of
APm
c
i |o,mc−1 when i follows a∗i and a′i, respectively. By Fact 2, if i defects some neighbour in a′i,
we have APm
1
i |o,m1−1,a′i−APm
c
i |o,m1−1,a∗i > degmi . For every c ≥ 0 with APm
c
i |o,mc−1,a∗i ≥ degm
c
i ,
we have
APm
c+1
i |o,mc+1−1,a∗i −AP
mc
i |o,mc−1,a∗i = degm
c
i .
Let m∗ = mc be the first round where APm
c
i |o,mc−1,a∗i ≤ degm
c
i . When i follows a
∗
i , in round m
∗,
i is punished by an expected number of APm
∗
i |o,m∗−1,a∗i neighbours, while not being punished
afterwards in rounds m∗+ cn for c > 0. When i follows a′i, i is punished in rounds m
∗+ cn for
c ≥ 0 by an additional expected number of degmi neighbours. Moreover, since i always has at
least one neighbour and i never defects after m, by Fact 2 and the fact that APm+ni |o,m+n−1,a′i ≤
n−1, we have APmni |o,mn−1,a′i = 0. This implies that the additional punishments when i follows
a′i must occur in rounds between m + 1 and m + n
2. By the same arguments as in the proof
of Fact 5, it follows that the expected utility of i decreases at least by βdegmi in these rounds
when i follows a′i instead of a
∗
i , as we intended to prove.
We can now show that ∆ ≥ 0. If i does not defect a neighbour in a′i, then ∆m ≥ 0 and
by Fact 5 ∆ ≥ 0. If i defects neighbours in a′i, then ∆m ≥ −degmi , and by Fact 6, we have
∆ ≥ −degmi + δn
2
βdegmi . So, if β > 1 and δ is sufficiently close to 1, then ∆ ≥ 0. This concludes
the proof.
6.5 Avoiding Knowledge of Degree
We now discuss one type of interactions in general pairwise exchanges and corresponding imple-
mentation of ~σgen, assuming only that agents know the identities of their neighbours. We need at
least two communication phases, so that neighbours i and j may first reveal their degree in phase 1,
and then exchange values in phase 2 and punish each other accordingly. Unfortunately, two phases
is not enough because i may lie about the degree. In particular, in phase 1, i may declare a higher
degree than the real one to decrease the probability of being punished by j. We can address this
by including in the report information about the declared degrees, and then punish agents that lie
about their degrees. This is still not sufficient though, because of the following scenario. Suppose
that i only has one neighbour j and only one pending punishment. If i does not lie, then j punishes
i with probability 1 due to having a single pending punishment. If i declares a degree of n − 1
instead, then the probability of being punished by j is only 1/(n−1). This yields an increase in the
expected benefits from 0 to β(n−2)/(n−1). Suppose that i also defects j by omitting messages in
phase 2. The expected future loss must be at most β, to avoid the problem identified in the proof
of need for eventual distinguishability. Since we only assume that β > 1, the loss may be lower
than the gain. The problem is that i sends the degree before incurring the cost of sending messages
in phase 2. We can avoid this by using a technique of delaying gratification employed in [18]. We
need three communication phases. In phase 1, agents exchange monitoring information and the
values ciphered with random private keys. In phase 2, they reveal the degrees. Finally, in phase
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3, they decide whether to cooperate by sending the private keys, or to punish by sending arbitrary
keys. Let ακ be the cost of sending a key, such that the cost of sending phase 1 and 2 messages
plus ακ is 1. Agent i is punished for defecting j in phases 1 or 2 by not receiving the value in phase
3. In this case, i avoids at most 1 + α, but loses β > 1 + α (notice that, by consistency of beliefs, i
always believes that it will receive the value in phase 3 prior to this phase, even if j does not send
its value correctly ciphered, because i cannot distinguish ciphered values from arbitrary ones). The
maximum utility gain obtained by i is when i has only one neighbour j, i lies to j by saying that its
degree is n− 1, and then defect j in phase 3. The maximum gain is β(n− 2)/(n− 1) +ακ, whereas
the future loss is δβ. If ακ < β/(n− 1), then the gain is less than β, and the future loss outweighs
the gain for a δ sufficiently close to 1. Therefore, we have a protocol that enforces accountability.
6.6 Complexity
The bit complexity of ~σgen is O(n3): each message carries n3 reports, with one report per pair of
agents and round in 1 · · · ρ, carries n2 accusations, and carries n2 numbers of pending punishments.
The maximum delay of punishments is O(n2). We can improve the complexity by assuming further
restrictions on G∗ and on the computational ability of agents. Specifically, the factors n3 and n2 are
a function of (1) the maximum delay n of disseminating information relative to an agent, and (2)
the maximum number n of agents relative to which an agent has to forward information. (1) can be
improved by considering more restrictive assumptions about G∗. As discussed in the definition of
adversary restricted by connectivity, we only need that the neighbours of any given agent i in round
m can causally influence all the neighbours of i in round m+ρ for some constant ρ. If the evolving
graphs satisfy locality properties that ensure that the neighbours of agent i’s neighbours are likely
to be i’s neighbours in the near future, then ρ can be significantly smaller than n. Then, the bit
complexity becomes O(ρn2) and the maximum delay of punishments becomes O(ρn). Small-world
networks such as social networks, which have a high clustering coefficient, are well known examples
that satisfy such locality properties [12, 25].
Interestingly, locality properties also allow us the improve on (2). Agents only have to forward
information relative to an agent i and round m in the ρ rounds following m. This is necessary
to ensure that critical information reaches the agents capable of carrying a punishment. If during
every period of ρ rounds each agent were only causally influenced by a limited number c of agents,
then agents only needed to forward information relative to c agents, and the bit complexity and
delay of punishments would be O(ρc2) and O(ρc), respectively. Unfortunately, such reduction on
the amount of information each agent forwards introduces a congestion problem. Specifically, we
cannot let agents sending messages of varying size, since that would incentivize them to always
forward the minimum required information to save bandwidth. Therefore, they must forward
messages of fixed size, which implies that agents may have to discard information if they cannot
fit all received information in a single message. This gives the opportunity for an agent i to
deliberately generate false reports (or accusations) that flood the network, causing other agents to
discard accusations against i. We can address this issue by appending to each report and accusation
a signature of the issuer. A report of an interaction between i and j has issuer i, so a valid report
of this interaction must contain a signature of i. The same applies to accusations and numbers
of pending punishments. The only disadvantage of this approach is that it requires agents to be
computationally bounded.
7 Discussion
Our results provide technical insight on the type of dynamic networks that can support pair-
wise exchanges in equilibria strategies. The need for timely punishments means that accountability
cannot be enforced in some dynamic networks such as certain overlays for file-sharing. If connec-
tivity is ensured, accountability may be enforced, even for general exchanges. Although for this
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scenario we have assumed knowledge of degree prior to interactions, this can be relaxed if agents
can exchange multiple messages per round. Finally, if exchanges are valuable, timely punishments
are enough to enforce accountability, which opens the door to protocols that enforce accountability
in a wide variety of dynamic networks. There are multiple open questions to be addressed in future
work. It would be interesting to prove a stronger condition that would close the gap between an
adversary restricted by distinguishability and one restricted by connectivity. Another open issue
is collusion. We believe that both the necessary and sufficient conditions presented in this paper
could be strengthened by generalizing the notion of causal influence without interference from in-
dividual agents to the absence of interference from members of a coalition. Given these conditions,
the G∗-OAPE strategies are resilient to collusion.
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